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1963 
BOOK REVIEWS 
ON TRUST, LAW, AND EXPECTING THE WORST 
INTIMATE LIES AND THE LAW.  By Jill Elaine Hasday.  New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press.  2019.  Pp. 294.  $34.95. 
Reviewed by Elizabeth F. Emens∗ 
man says he will marry a woman, while he’s secretly involved with    
someone else, just long enough to get her brother’s kidney.1  The 
couple sets a date, and the kidney transplant takes place.  Riding home 
from the hospital, the groom-to-be announces the engagement is indefi-
nitely postponed.  A year later, he marries the other woman (p. 30).2 
An American woman meets a Soviet man on a cultural exchange 
program and, after he professes his love and proposes, she marries him.3  
She spends the next three-and-a-half years working to help him immi-
grate to the United States, paying $15,000 in expenses and dedicating 
approximately twenty hours per week to his immigration admin, delay-
ing the completion of her doctorate and thus diminishing her income.4  
After her husband’s successful immigration, she learns that he lied about 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  For helpful conver-
sations and comments on earlier drafts, I thank Ian Ayres, Emily Benfer, Judson Brewer, Mathilde 
Cohen, Yaron Covo, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Amy DiBona, Jens Frankenreiter, Kellen Funk, Jill 
Hasday, Alexis J. Hoag, Bert Huang, Clare Huntington, Sarah Lawsky, Gillian Lester, Lev Menand, 
Brian Richardson, Daniel Richman, Russell Robinson, Elizabeth Scott, Joshua Sealy-Harrington, 
Rena Seltzer, Colleen Shanahan, Jane Spinak, Ilan Stein, Susan Sturm, Cass Sunstein, Kristen  
Underhill, Caroline Voldstad, Patricia Williams, and participants in the Columbia Law School  
Faculty Workshop and the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Invited  
Symposium: Philosophy of Sex and Love.  For excellent research assistance, I thank Kayla C. Butler, 
Brett Donaldson, James Gordon, Ian Harris, Stephen Hogan-Mitchell, Jennifer Katz, Zane Muller, 
Julia Oksasoglu, and Kathleen Stanaro, as well as the outstanding reference librarians at Columbia 
Law School, especially R. Martin Witt and Nam Jin Yoon.  Lastly, my thanks also to the staff of 
the Harvard Law Review for their careful and thoughtful editing. 
 1 Complaint at 3–6, Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 1997) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 2 For additional information on this case, see Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906, slip op. at 1–
3, 12–13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998); Man Took a Kidney, Broke a Heart but Won’t Be Sued, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 22, 1998), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date= 
19980122&slug=2730146 [https://perma.cc/C9CA-2GWL]. 
 3 Gubin v. Lodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782, 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).   
 4 Although immigration admin can be time-consuming, twenty hours per week might sound 
excessive without these particulars: the Soviet government refused to grant him an exit visa, and 
she undertook a public advocacy campaign, becoming a spokeswoman for the Divided Spouses 
Coalition, an organization advocating for Soviets separated from their American spouses (pp. 80–
81).  See generally Isabel Wilkerson, Group Working to Reunify Americans with Soviet Spouses, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 1987), https://nyti.ms/29zDXf4 [https://perma.cc/5MV4-D5ZG].  “Admin” is 
the office-type work of life.  See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1419–21 (2015).   
A
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his feelings and intentions; he was merely using her as a conduit to legal 
immigration (pp. 80–81).5 
An eighteen-year-old girl is in a debilitating car accident and spends 
the next two years recuperating in her parents’ home.6  During that 
time, she receives a $63,000 settlement check from the driver of the car, 
which she entrusts to her father.  Contrary to her mother’s report that 
the money is “being held in an investment account for her benefit,”7 the 
daughter learns later that her parents had spent $30,000 on them-
selves — which was the entire sum remaining after paying for her med-
ical bills and car (p. 180).8 
These plaintiffs’ accounts populate the pages of Professor Jill 
Hasday’s Intimate Lies and the Law (pp. 30, 80–81, 180–81).9  And like 
most of the plaintiffs discussed by Hasday, they lose in court.10 
Not all of the book’s plaintiffs deserve to win.  Some of the cases invite 
debate.  Consider the young woman whose parents spent the settlement 
from her car accident.  Even by her account, she waited nine years after 
moving out before asking her parents about the money; her mother denies 
ever saying the funds were being held in an investment account; and her 
father says he understood the remainder after paying for her car and med-
ical expenses to cover the reasonable costs of her room and board.11   
Debating these cases could make for lively Thanksgiving dinner conver-
sation — or exam hypos in Torts or Contracts. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Gubin, 494 N.W.2d at 784 (“The plaintiff . . . devoted years . . . to bring[] him to the United 
States . . . after which he promptly abandoned all pretense of having desired a marriage relationship 
based upon love and affection.  There is no other conclusion that can be drawn from this record 
than that the defendant’s actions were a blatant and crass attempt to fraudulently induce the plain-
tiff to marry him for no other reason than to obtain . . . lawful entry into the United States.”). 
 6 Hanna v. Sheflin, 275 S.W.3d 423, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 7 Id. at 428 n.5.  Her mother denied ever saying this.  Id. at 425, 428 n.5. 
 8 See id. at 425. 
 9 I have told the stories from the plaintiffs’ perspectives.  For more on this choice, see infra note 
63; for some aggregate information about the plaintiffs in the book, see infra note 30. 
 10 In Dahl v. McNutt (the kidney case), the Minnesota District Court dismissed all the claims 
except the brother–kidney donor’s claim for lost wages and possible out-of-pocket costs of the sur-
gery.  No. C3-97-601906, slip op. at 22 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998).  In Gubin v. Lodisev (the 
Soviet immigration case), the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, finding that the 
plaintiff couldn’t sustain a separate action for fraud apart from her divorce action, where all finan-
cial considerations should be dealt with.  494 N.W.2d at 784–85.  The court reduced the damages 
award of $113,087 to $76,687, id. at 785–86, and remanded for the lower court to determine whether 
the remaining $76,687 could be “appropriately associated with a divorce action” instead of damages 
for fraud, id. at 787.  And in Hanna v. Sheflin (the young woman whose parents spent her car 
accident settlement), the Tennessee Court of Appeals ruled that the three-year statute of limitations 
on a conversion suit could not be tolled to cover the subsequent ten-year delay because she failed 
to show that “her father took affirmative action to conceal her cause of action from her” and that 
“she could not have discovered her cause of action despite exercising reasonable diligence.”  275 
S.W.3d at 428. 
 11 See Hanna, 275 S.W.3d at 425–27. 
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Hasday argues that many of these plaintiffs should, however, be win-
ning or at least have a chance of winning.  Which they would, she con-
tends, if courts were treating these claims the same way courts treat  
deception by non-intimates (pp. 200–10).  Courts not only dismiss cases 
involving intimate deception, sometimes overturning substantial jury 
awards in a plaintiff’s favor, but also chide duped intimates for not being 
more savvy, for not being vigilant enough to detect the deception (pp. 49, 
76, 181).12  These courts seem to blame plaintiffs for trusting those they 
love.  One woman, whose husband lied to her to hide his bigamy, financial 
misdeeds, and more, is quoted by Hasday as lamenting:  
I trusted him, I believed in him, and yet I am branded ‘stupid’ for doing so.  
On top of losing everything I own and facing a future raising three children 
on my own, it is hard to know that society as a whole views me as some 
kind of fool.  (p. 92)13 
Trust emerges as a potent subtheme in the book, but one which is in-
complete.  In this Review, I turn squarely to the subject of trust, drawing 
on sources from psychology, philosophy, management theory, literature, 
and diverse areas of law.  After exploring dimensions of trust, I build out 
a framework that combines affective trust (a feeling of safety) and  
cognitive distrust (a willingness to doubt and inquire), later reframed as 
epistemic curiosity (a drive to know14).  Approaching intimate relation-
ships with both affective trust and epistemic curiosity is no easy feat.  An 
appreciation of this, I argue, helps us to understand better Hasday’s pro-
posals for reform, as well as to spur further legal innovations. 
This Review has three parts.  Part I aims to convey something of the 
breadth and interest of Hasday’s fascinating new book, foregrounding 
the role of gender and beginning to touch the subject of trust.  Part II 
delves briefly but widely into the theme of trust, which pervades the 
book and invites further examination.  Part III presents a framework 
that combines affective trust and epistemic curiosity and applies this 
framework to illuminate and sort Hasday’s proposals for reform; to cri-
tique a recent, dramatic change in the evidentiary treatment of marital 
confidences; and to devise a novel approach to prenuptial agreements.  
Throughout, this Review aims to engage and inspire the reader’s own 
thinking.  Together, we’ll make it worth your time.  Trust me. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 For example, Hasday explains that “the Tennessee Court of Appeals blamed Hanna for not 
promptly investigating her father, faulting this trusting daughter for not devoting more ‘care and 
diligence’ to ‘discovering her father’s alleged conversion of the funds’” (p. 181) (quoting Hanna, 275 
S.W.3d at 425). 
 13 The author quotes MARY TURNER THOMSON, THE BIGAMIST 234 (2008). 
 14 “Drive” here is meant colloquially, not technically, so it is not an embrace of one side of the 
debate in the social science literature about whether curiosity is “drive.”  See, e.g., Jordan Litman, 
Curiosity: Nature, Dimensionality, and Determinants, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
MOTIVATION AND LEARNING 418, 418–19 (K. Ann Renninger & Suzanne E. Hidi eds., 2019). 
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I.  ESTABLISHING TRUST 
To my loved ones.  You did not inspire me to write this book. 
— Jill Elaine Hasday, epigraph to Intimate Lies and the Law 
Intimate Lies and the Law is thoroughly researched, analytically rig-
orous, and doctrinally pragmatic.  The book is replete with fascinating 
narratives and legal puzzles.  These are features a reader of Hasday’s 
work has come to expect.  An added bonus is the text’s occasional hu-
mor, as in the epigraph. 
The book should be of interest not only to those who study torts, 
contracts, and family law.  This comprehensive treatment should also 
engage anyone interested in the psychology or sociology of intimacy.  It 
may even invite readers who want to understand their rights and obli-
gations — and what to watch out for — in their relationships. 
This Part of my Review highlights several of the book’s key contribu-
tions, describes its normative argument, and sets the stage for an exami-
nation of the theme of trust within and beyond intimate relationships. 
A.  Practice, Prohibition, and Prescription 
Intimate Lies and the Law is a study of both the practice and the 
law of intimate deception.  Hasday thus derives her definition of inti-
mate deception from a combination of legal and extralegal sources.  Her 
definition of “intimate” — meant to track how courts conceive of inti-
macy — “includes dates, sexual and/or romantic partners, and family 
members such as spouses, parents, and children” (p. 6); it excludes 
friends, therapists, and other professional relations.  Hasday defines “de-
ception” as “intentional acts or omissions . . . designed to make another 
person believe something that the deceiver himself does not believe to 
be true” (p. 7).  Unlike her definition of “intimate,” Hasday’s definition 
of “deception” is not tied to the law; instead, it is rooted in social science 
literature (p. 7).  Intimate deception, then, does not necessarily involve 
a legal wrong. 
Defining deception independent of court findings is important to 
Hasday’s aims in the book.  She writes, “Adopting a consistent definition 
of deception that does not turn on whether a court has reached a legal 
judgment that the defendant deceived the plaintiff allows me to capture 
a fuller picture of how the law regulates intimate deception, including 
by denying claims” (p. 7).  This definition foreshadows the book’s con-
cern with those who fall outside of the law’s protection. 
The central legal drama Hasday presents is courts’ differential treat-
ment of those who deceive their intimates and those who deceive anyone 
else.  As Hasday writes, “[A]n overriding premise that courts have  
embraced in creating this body of law . . . [is] the assumption that people  
deceived within intimate relationships do not and should not have access  
to remedies that are available to people deceived in other contexts”  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575699
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(pp. 97–98).  It is worth pausing over this statement, since it may be sur-
prising.  Courts treat deceived intimates less favorably, despite established 
norms that we should trust intimates more.  We will return to this point.  
But first it is worth delving further into the question of who counts as an 
intimate in these decisions, now that it is clearer what is at stake. 
The boundaries of intimacy in these cases do not neatly track com-
mon expectations: romantic and sexual relationships are inside the circle 
of intimacy, as are the relationships of children to parents; however, 
other relationships that we commonly consider intimate do not garner 
special treatment (that is, disfavor) in the courts.  Thus, as Hasday pre-
sents these cases, courts permit parents to dupe their kids — even their 
adult kids — but not the other way around (p. 173).  And siblings can’t 
dupe each other without consequence (pp. 191–93).  By contrast, roman-
tic relationships are a prime site for deception that goes unremedied.  
And romantic relationships are defined very broadly.  Intimate love, for 
purposes of courts’ treatment of intimate deception, sweeps in people 
who barely know each other (pp. 158–59).15 
The ultimate aim of the book is to map what is happening in the 
courts and to propose legal reforms.  But before turning to the law, the 
book draws on wide-ranging sources to help the reader understand the 
context for these cases.  Two chapters use social science to illuminate 
the how and the why of such deception (pp. 27–76).  A third sets out the 
harsh consequences that can ensue (pp. 77–95).  Then Hasday turns to 
the history and analysis of the law that governs this arena (pp. 97–195). 
The reasons for courts’ special treatment of intimate lies are multi-
ple.  The book offers a short history of the law of intimate deception, 
focusing on three changes that have shaped the legal landscape.  One is 
shifting norms that mean courts look less favorably on cases rooted in 
subordinating attitudes, for instance, cases involving a plaintiff who is 
disappointed to learn the race of an intimate partner (pp. 116–24).  Ac-
cording to Hasday, those claims have “virtually disappeared” (p. 121).16 
A second change is the no-fault divorce revolution.  According to 
Hasday, the decline of fault divorce decreased the number of intimate 
deception claims being brought — because proving fault was no longer 
important to getting a divorce — and also led some courts to be less 
sympathetic to intimate deception claims on the grounds that changing 
divorce laws expressed a policy against entertaining such arguments in 
court (pp. 128–33). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 Hasday describes a case, for example, involving a woman who sought child support for a fake 
pregnancy after a brief sexual relationship resulting in financial losses and emotional distress, which 
a court referred to as the “messy aftermath that all too often follows casual sexual encounters and 
failed romances” and declined to involve itself in (p. 159) (quoting Starr v. Woolf, No. C047594, 
2005 WL 1532369, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2005) (emphasis added)). 
 16 For further discussion, see infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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The third, the decline of the so-called heart balm torts,17 involves 
complex gender dynamics (pp. 110–16) and raises interesting questions 
about what stories people want to hear and whom they trust to tell those 
stories.  This is the subject of the next section. 
B.  The Rise and Fall of Intimate Deception Claims, or,  
Itchy Palms and Aching Hearts 
The fate of suits for breach of promise to marry might seem a rare 
context where the law of intimate deception is easy to explain: anti–
heart balm statutes preclude the suits at issue.  But as with the other 
narratives in the book, the legal story gets complicated in court.  Courts 
have interpreted these anti–heart balm statutes so broadly that cases 
that have even a whiff of engagement inspire courts to refuse recovery 
(p. 110) — including cases where the parties were merely romantically 
involved but not engaged (p. 112); where the parties actually married, 
so no breach of promise to marry even occurred (pp. 111–12); and even 
where the alleged romantic partner was entirely fabricated through an 
elaborate ruse set up to deceive (pp. 110–11, 115–16). 
The history here makes good reading, and Hasday is both engaging 
and parsimonious in the telling.  Essentially, before the 1930s, these torts 
offered means for duped intimates to recover for their injuries (p. 101).  
Breach of promise to marry suits didn’t require the jilted woman to 
prove whether the man deceived her about his intentions or merely 
changed his mind; either way she could recover (p. 101).  From 1935 
onward, states began passing laws to prohibit these tort suits — starting 
with Indiana and New York and, by the end of the twentieth century, 
including a majority of states (pp. 104–07). 
Key campaigners included women.  Roberta West Nicholson,  
Indiana’s only female legislator, led the charge (p. 104).  She “insisted 
that the women suing for breach of promise or seduction were fraudsters 
with fabricated claims designed to extract money from wealthy men” — 
hiding their “itching palms in the guise of aching hearts” (p. 105).18   
Nicholson urged other women to run for the state legislature to support 
her anti–heart balm bill, which, she asserted, “protected wives and fem-
inine members of the family of men who suffered from the often un-
founded blackmailing machinations of unscrupulous women” (p. 105).19  
According to Nicholson, “‘[S]elf-respecting women’ did not bring heart 
balm actions” (p. 105).20 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 Heart balm torts, as Hasday defines them, consist of four main causes of action: “breach of 
promise to marry, seduction, criminal conversation, and alienation of affections” (p. 100). 
 18 The author quotes Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly 
Pass “Love Bill,” INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. 1, 1935, pt.1, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19 The author quotes More Women for Assembly Asked, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Feb. 13, 1935, 
at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20 The author quotes Aching Hearts Are Itching Palms, Says Woman Legislator as Men Gallantly 
Pass “Love Bill,” supra note 18, at 1. 
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The public apparently trusted Nicholson more than the plaintiffs she 
critiqued, although not everyone bought into these types of accounts (p. 
106).  Hasday has found no evidence to vindicate that trust (p. 105).  Nor 
is evidence available to support the claims of New York State Senator 
John McNaboe, sponsor of the second anti–heart balm statute passed in 
1935, that “the law was targeting ‘a tribute of $10,000,000 paid annually 
by New York men to gold-diggers and blackmailers’ and . . . that ‘[n]ine 
out of ten recent breach of promise suits have been of the racketeer 
type’” (p. 107).21 
As a woman crusader for laws banning heart balm torts, Roberta 
West Nicholson was neither unusual nor eccentric.  Her politically var-
ied female compatriots included, among others, Eleanor Roosevelt.  
“When she spoke in support of New York’s anti–heart balm bill a few 
days before the governor signed it into law,” Hasday recounts, “the First 
Lady told reporters: ‘I don’t think anyone who was really hurt would 
ever sue’” (p. 108).22 
The campaigns against the heart balm torts reflected a convergence 
of interests23 that may look, at least to modern eyes, bleak if not simply 
ugly.24  Men who want to protect themselves or each other from women 
who might reasonably have a claim to recourse, on the one hand, con-
verge with women who don’t want to associate with the kind of women 
so dependent on men (that is, so willing to admit their dependency and 
vulnerability) that they would bring a lawsuit for disappointed expecta-
tions of care and protection, on the other (pp. 107–10).  The latter group 
aligns women concerned with sex equality and women concerned with 
morality in their shared suspicion of those women who dare to invite 
the state, and the public gaze, into their intimate lives. 
The sense of women’s relative dependence is an uncomfortable 
thread, often surfacing in the opinions only subtly.  Occasionally, though, 
disparagement of women’s injuries was more obvious.  The case of 
Gring v. Lerch25 is exemplary.  Gring involved a woman whose fiancé 
discovered she was unable to perform the “sexual ‘duties of a wife’” due 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 The author quotes Move Planned in 8 Other States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1935, at 3 (altera-
tion in original). 
 22 The author quotes Law Banning Heart-Balm Suits Wins Approval of First Lady, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 26, 1935, at 2. 
 23 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (“The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will 
be accommodated only when it converges with the interest of whites.”). 
 24 Even some contemporaries viewed it as such (p. 106) (quoting Indiana State Senator William 
Dennigan, an opponent of Nicholson’s anti–heart balm bill, as asking, “Do you mean to tell me you 
will help women by taking away their civil rights against philanderers and men who prey upon 
them?” (citation omitted)).  
 25 112 Pa. 244 (1886). 
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to “‘a physical incapacity’” in the form of “an unusually ‘thickened  
hymen’” (p. 125).26  In the court’s words, 
A man does not court and marry a woman for the mere pleasure of paying 
for her board and washing.  He expects and is entitled to something in 
return, and if the woman with whom he contracts be incapable by reason 
of a natural impediment of giving him the comfort and satisfaction to which 
as a married man he would be entitled, there is a failure of the moving 
consideration of such contract, and no court ought to enforce it by giving 
damages for its breach.  (p. 125)27 
Elsewhere the court observed, “It would be a fraud to sell a cow with such 
a defect without making it known to the purchaser. . . .  He was entitled 
to have a wife capable of copulation in the usual way when he married 
her.”28  In Hasday’s telling, Gring exemplifies one earlier thread casting 
women as property, whether as farm animals or as objects (p. 125). 
This older way of speaking about women, Hasday explains, is later 
replaced by rhetoric endorsing women’s equality and independence (pp. 
126–27).29  Though salutary at a structural level, this change is at best 
mixed for individual plaintiffs, some of whom were surely benefiting from 
the pity or chivalry of courts toward their position as the weaker sex. 
Women are the principal losers in this story.  The plaintiffs who seek 
vindication in court for the lies that cost them money, time, and dignity 
are often women.30  Hasday does not hide this fact.  She adverts to it 
throughout, and the book’s cover features a bride and groom dressed in 
wedding garb, with his fingers crossed behind his back.  But at key sum-
mary moments she embraces gender-neutral language, referring to “de-
ceived intimates” and seeming to avoid pronouns (p. 202).31  She acknowl-
edges but treads lightly around the gendered dimensions of the story. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 The author quotes id. at 245. 
 27 The author quotes id. at 250. 
 28 Id. at 249. 
 29 One example Hasday cites for this changing rhetoric is the case of Singh v. Singh, 611 N.E.2d 
347 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), in which the Ohio Court of Appeals denied a man recovery in the name 
of rejecting the oppressive regime of arranged marriages (pp. 127–28).  This case did not evidence 
the particular gender dynamic I describe in the text, as this suit involved a man whose recovery 
was denied. 
 30 A superficial count of the cases Hasday discusses finds that women make up sixty-four per-
cent of the plaintiffs in the cases where Hasday gives enough detail to discern the gender of the 
plaintiff and that cases in which a woman sues a man make up sixty-seven percent of the cases with 
enough detail to discern the gender of both the plaintiff and the defendant.  This count excludes 
the parentage cases involving a deceiver lying to a partner about being the parent and the criminal 
cases because the prosecutor there (the state) is genderless.  Cases with both female and male co-
plaintiffs or co-defendants are also not included in the count.  My thanks to Julia Oksasoglu for 
performing this tally.  Note that there is of course no reason to assume that these represent the 
landscape of all cases filed or decided in any given period; it merely gives a sense of the gender 
breakdown in the cases Hasday includes and discusses in sufficient detail.  
 31 Hasday explains that “[l]egal acknowledgement and legitimation of such arguments — after 
a long history in which the law discounted and dismissed the claims of deceived intimates and 
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Many male plaintiffs populate these pages as well,32 so Hasday con-
sciously chooses not to foreground the theme of gender (p. 7).  This is un-
derstandable, but the whole dilemma also highlights an interesting point 
about gender and authorship: the book looks quite different if gender is the 
headline.  (Imagine a book called Deceived Women and the Law — or even 
Gender, Lies, and the Law — rather than Intimate Lies and the Law.)  And 
the author of such a book arguably looks different — more emotional, 
more partial, less serious, perhaps even, to some readers, less trustworthy.  
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,33 the Supreme Court described the 
pressure to be masculine and feminine at the same time as “an intolera-
ble and impermissible catch 22.”34  As Professor Kenji Yoshino has sug-
gested, though this bind may be unfair, it is far from unusual.35  This is 
the bind that many women (and non-women) confront regularly: if they 
are working or performing in a professional sphere designed for men or 
evaluated by men, they may be judged by masculine standards of per-
formance while also being expected to maintain certain standards of 
femininity.  The Court makes this bind sound impossible but, despite its 
unfairness, one way or another, many people (often women) manage this 
bind effectively.36  Those presenting feminist ideas perhaps face a par-
allel bind, one that Hasday, like many writers before her, has navigated 
successfully. 
C.  A Paradox of Prevalence? 
The gender frame might lead us to expect courts to dismiss these 
claims of intimate deception as trivial.  This is indeed what Hasday had 
anticipated finding in her study: 
I began this project suspecting that courts might deny remedies to deceived 
intimates out of a belief that intimate deception is insufficiently important 
to merit judicial concern.  But judges deciding intimate deception cases of-
ten appear convinced that this regulatory arena is vitally important.  More 
specifically, judges seem to think that it is crucial to govern intimate decep-
tion in ways that maintain and reinforce current norms and practices in 
courtship, sexual relationships, and marriage.  (p. 157) 
By Hasday’s account, courts view these matters not as too trivial to 
address but, in a sense, as too important.  And, she adds, with her subtle 
humor, “Courts are intent on upholding the status quo in intimacy,  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
blamed them for being duped — can be important to plaintiffs whose injuries are taken seriously 
and whose deceivers are held accountable.  Such recognition can also be uplifting to deceived inti-
mates who never sue” (p. 202; see also pp. 6, 87). 
 32 See supra note 30 (discussing the gender makeup of the cases). 
 33 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 34 Id. at 251 (plurality opinion). 
 35 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 157 (2006) (describing “[t]he plurality’s Catch-22 theory” 
as “naïve”). 
 36 Id. 
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although they never quite explain why the status quo is worth protecting 
so fiercely if deceit is as common in intimate relationships as judges 
assume” (p. 157).  Court decisions seem to Hasday to rest on the im-
portance of protecting people’s ability to lie without consequence to their 
intimates — a practice some courts suggest is widespread (p. 156).37 
The wide-ranging and interesting data in the book’s chapters on the 
social science of deception support the perception that such deceit is 
common.  Two interrelated threads may help us to understand courts’ 
reactions to these cases: First, people generally subscribe to a “truth de-
fault,”38 assuming what they’re told is true (pp. 53–54).  Second, roman-
tic relationships frequently involve deception — on the front end, when 
people lie to lure others into relationships; and in the middle and back 
end, when people lie to keep others in relationships or to cover their 
violation of monogamy norms (pp. 28–32).39 
Perhaps courts’ rejection of such claims, then, stems from the ubiq-
uity of the deceit.  Its frequency may normalize it, making it almost 
invisible to courts.  An invisibility account seems plausible on its face 
but would not explain the harsh words courts apply to those betrayed 
by their intimates.40  Perhaps, then, judges push these cases out of court 
because they don’t want to see the possibility of such deception in their 
own intimate lives.  This explanation could help answer for courts’ crit-
icism of plaintiffs.  This is a familiar dynamic: outsiders shunning and 
judging harshly those who fall prey to any common calamity, wanting 
to distance themselves.  
Writing in a different context, I used the term paradox of prevalence 
to describe the social norms surrounding nonmonogamy.41  The starting 
point of that piece was a puzzle at the beginning of this century: even 
while same-sex marriage was being hotly debated, most everyone on 
both sides of the political spectrum agreed that multiparty relationships 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 As Hasday describes it, “Judges start by presuming that deceit pervades romance, sex, and 
marriage, and they contend with little — if any — explanation that courts should accordingly pro-
tect commonplace intimate deception from legal redress” (p. 156) (emphasis added). 
 38 Hasday uses the phrase “truth bias” to describe this concept (pp. 53–54).  I use the more 
common phrase “truth default.”  See sources cited infra note 68. 
 39 Hasday explains that “deceit can be central to intimate relationships and can secure crucial 
benefits for deceivers” (p. 28). 
 40 See supra note 12.  Another interesting gloss on these cases would draw on the recent work 
of Roseanna Sommers finding that the commonsense lay perception of consent is that it is compat-
ible with fraud.  See Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 5) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Fascinating as this finding is, it 
wouldn’t help explain why courts treat intimate deception differently from non-intimate decep-
tion — nor would it answer for courts’ criticism of those duped by their intimates. 
 41 Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 284 (2004) (arguing that a “paradox of prevalence” governs 
our legal and social norms surrounding nonmonogamy). 
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were beyond the pale.42  Those on the political right used the spectre of 
polygamy to threaten a parade of horribles that would follow from lift-
ing the sex restriction on marriage; those on the left agreed such a parade 
would be horrible but disputed the link to same-sex marriage.43  The 
sweeping opposition to multiparty relationships seemed all the more 
puzzling given that, based on any available statistics, nonmonogamy in 
the form of adultery was fairly common.44  If nonmonogamy was so 
common, why would people so roundly oppose open, honest, consensual 
nonmonogamy — sometimes called “polyamory”?  This I called a para-
dox of prevalence.45  I suggested that the pervasiveness of nonmonog-
amy meant that open polyamory was all the more threatening, as it 
forced people to confront the risk of something in their own lives that 
they didn’t want to see.46 
At an individual level, this dynamic is akin to homophobia,47 or, 
more generally, the psychological phenomenon of projection, in which 
people attribute their own unwanted feelings onto others.48  But the 
paradox of prevalence takes into account fears about one’s relation-
ship — rather than one’s internal self — fears that are stirred up by 
awareness of the statistical probability of betrayal. 
A similar dynamic may help fuel distrust of women and others who 
bring claims of intimate deception.  Courts, anti–heart balm campaigners, 
and others may prefer to distance themselves from the possibility of decep-
tion, so statistically common, by shunning those who try to bring it to light. 
This is an interesting hypothesis and may well capture part of the 
dynamic at work in these cases.  The next section contemplates a more 
practical problem for the courts. 
D.  Trusting Courts 
Judges contemplating complaints of intimate deception must face 
this concern: the possibility that allowing these suits will open the courts 
to complicated cases brought by disappointed lovers seeking revenge 
through the legal system. 
This concern lies at the intersection of two lines of argument.  The first 
argument relates to the difficulty of determining fault.  The heart balm 
torts have been criticized on the same basis that fault-based divorce was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Id. at 279–83. 
 43 Id. at 279–80. 
 44 Id. at 297–300.  
 45 Id. at 284. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See id. at 345–46 (discussing homophobia). 
 48 See, e.g., ANNA FREUD, 2 THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE 122 (Cecil 
Baines trans., rev. ed. 1966); SIGMUND FREUD, THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 111 (Maria 
Bonaparte, Anna Freud & Ernst Kris eds., Eric Mosbacher & James Strachey trans., 1954). 
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criticized: it can be very hard to discern who is the wrongdoer in an inti-
mate relationship (pp. 107, 130–31).49  This critique of the heart balm torts 
could apply more broadly to claims for deception in the intimate sphere 
as well.  As others have observed, where the frame of a relationship is 
intimacy, complex dynamics shielded from the public eye are likely to be 
not only present but central (p. 49).  Of course, courts decide all kinds of 
difficult matters, so this is not to say such resolution is impossible, or to 
assert any definite conclusion about it.  The point is merely that such a 
concern is a reasonable one, grounded in related debates. 
The second argument dovetails with the first: though a legal regime 
helps to shape spheres of human interaction through both intervention 
and non-intervention, the right to bring a civil suit is a powerful weapon 
that one individual can wield against another, whether or not the suit is 
successful.  Appreciating this argument requires taking a step back to 
understand the frame better. 
In principle, dismissing suits for intimate deception is a form of reg-
ulatory influence, just as vindicating such suits is a form of regulatory 
influence.  In either case, the law is structuring human relationships, 
either by effecting a legal entitlement to be free from intimate deception 
or by effecting a legal entitlement to deceive an intimate without conse-
quence.  Important scholarship on the regulatory state has illuminated 
the reality that both government action and inaction structure our lives 
and our rights.50  This work has informed writing, for instance, about 
the ways that the state structures and shapes who forms intimate rela-
tionships with whom51 — including by declining to remedy the legacy 
of race-based redlining of neighborhoods (and implementing federal 
benefits programs in ways that shape who can afford which neighbor-
hoods);52 or by declining to enforce federal disability law’s requirement 
that public accommodations be accessible to people with disabilities.53  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1225, 1296–97 (1998) (critiquing fault-based divorces). 
 50 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 197 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 888–90 (1987).   
 51 See, e.g., RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE 
AND ROMANCE 119 (2001); Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787, 2788 (2008); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s 
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2009). 
 52 See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD 
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 10–13, 142–72 
(2005); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 177–93 (2017); Samuel Nye Winslow, A House Is Not 
a Home for Everybody: Ameliorating the Effects of America’s Racially Discriminatory 20th Cen-
tury Housing Policies (Sept. 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library). 
 53 Emens, supra note 51, at 1380–81, 1392–93. 
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If only some people can live or travel or dine in some spaces, then only 
those people will meet, connect, fall in love, and marry.54  Even though 
law does not affirmatively tell us whom to marry, law does shape our 
choices in this most private sphere. 
When reading Intimate Lies and the Law, I was persuaded that our 
legal system is in a similar way regulating the sphere of intimate decep-
tion.  By declining to vindicate suits brought by individuals deceived by 
their intimates, courts are protecting one vision of intimate relationships.  
As Hasday writes, in a passage quoted earlier, “[J]udges seem to think 
that it is crucial to govern intimate deception in ways that maintain and 
reinforce current norms and practices in courtship, sexual relationships, 
and marriage” (p. 157).  And later, she observes that “the law always 
and inescapably regulates our intimate lives, whether courts side with 
plaintiffs or defendants in litigation over injuries stemming from inti-
mate deception” (p. 211). 
This is right.  And yet it does not fully capture the practical signifi-
cance of an alternative civil regime in which individuals can more read-
ily bring the power of the state to bear on each other by filing lawsuits.  
The act-omission distinction may be a philosophical fallacy and thus a 
“moral heuristic” in principle.55  But in the context of civil suits, the 
ability to file a lawsuit is a powerful weapon that does not exist if such 
a suit is disallowed or discouraged. 
The context of government regulation is different, in much the way 
that civil rights law made through impact litigation spearheaded by or-
ganized coalitions of advocates is different from civil rights law made 
through self-initiated suits filed by particular aggrieved plaintiffs.56  
When writing about intimate discrimination, I implicitly recognized this 
divide, as I urged regulatory reforms to the structural and background 
features that shape our intimate lives, but rejected the idea of allowing 
new individual lawsuits to remedy the problem.57  I drew on the teach-
ing of Professor Robert Ellickson — who used to tell his students (of 
which I was one) that “love triangles” are “much overrepresented” in the 
cases that make it to court58 — to argue that “widely authorizing  
discrimination-based heartbalm lawsuits would be truly perverse, as it 
would invite nearly every love triangle into court without even the need 
for a nexus with an independent legal issue.”59  The multifarious costs 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Id. at 1379–82. 
 55 See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 1581–
85 (2004). 
 56 See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Mem-
bers and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624–26 (1997). 
 57 Emens, supra note 51, at 1383–85. 
 58 Id. at 1384 & n.351 (citations omitted) (quoting Ellickson). 
 59 Id. at 1384. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575699
  
1976 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1963 
of litigation would of course prevent many such suits, as I noted there60 
and as Hasday also observes when offering her arguments against this 
kind of “floodgates” reasoning (pp. 212–13).61  What I failed to mention 
is that the mere threat of litigation can itself be a powerful weapon, and 
one which bears few if any of those costs. 
Thus, one further reason these plaintiffs may lose is a concern from 
courts about limiting access to the weaponry of civil suits.  This suggests 
the need for a limiting principle on any reform meant to expand access 
to such remedies.  In Part III, I will present a framework that is reflected 
in several of Hasday’s proposals for reform — and that can also offer 
such a limiting principle. 
* * * 
Gender is a significant theme in Intimate Lies and the Law, as this 
Part has highlighted.  But this is far from a story about courts refusing 
to recognize only women’s injuries in law.  Men get duped and denied 
remedies as well.  Recall the brother of the disappointed bride who gave 
his kidney so his sister would “never want for anything.”62  The bride’s 
brother, John Dahl, went through an excruciating experience.  The man 
needing a kidney (Richard McNutt) had been dating Dahl’s sister  
(Dorothy Zauhar), but had grown colder to her when the hospital con-
cluded she was medically prohibited from donating a kidney.63  On 
meeting Zauhar’s brother, McNutt warmed up again — eventually per-
suading Dahl to be the donor.64  After the surgery, Dahl had an adverse 
reaction to morphine and endured a painful recovery with no painkil-
lers.65  Although McNutt promised Dahl a life insurance policy in his 
name, the policy was never delivered.66  And other cases involve men 
whose losses do not depend on women’s harms (pp. 141, 158–59, 217), 
so they cannot be explained away through a gender-by-association story.  
A central problem for Mr. Dahl and his sister plagues these cases: 
how much should you ask an intimate to substantiate their story, and 
how much inquiry or research should you conduct to verify or challenge 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 Id. at 1384 n.351 (citing Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1093, 1139–51 (2008)).  It is worth noting too the inequities that would result from limiting cases 
through litigation costs.  See source cited infra note 208 and accompanying text.  Hasday recognizes 
these concerns about access to justice, while observing that they are not unique to this context (p. 212). 
 61 Hasday also believes that the number of cases will be limited because of the embarrassment 
associated with bringing such suits and the limits of a civil regime that prioritizes physical and 
financial injuries over emotional ones (pp. 212–13). 
 62 Complaint at 4, Dahl v. McNutt, No. C3-97-601906 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 1997) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library) (quoting defendant Richard H. McNutt). 
 63 Id. at 3.  As elsewhere, these facts are as represented by the plaintiff, since most of these 
plaintiffs lose as a matter of law. 
 64 Id. at 4. 
 65 Id. at 5. 
 66 Id. 
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it?  We’re not very good at detecting lies (p. 52).67  Our truth default is 
adaptive, argues Professor Timothy Levine, because we couldn’t func-
tion very well if we spent our time doubting and researching everything 
anyone ever told us.68  And yet, Hasday reveals, the law expects us to 
do precisely that in our intimate relationships.  These questions of trust, 
and expecting the worst, are the subject of Part II. 
II.  TRACING DIMENSIONS OF TRUST AND DISTRUST 
One cause for wariness about legal arguments faulting deceived inti-
mates for being overly trusting is that the law governing deception outside 
of intimacy is often more protective of the credulous — recognizing that 
such people are more likely to be duped, essentially by definition. . . .  The 
law often views the fact that a deceiver preyed on a trusting person as a 
strike against the deceiver, not his exoneration. 
— Jill Elaine Hasday (p. 50)69 
Hasday diagnoses a legal regime that expects intimates to anticipate 
the worst.  Trusting your intimates, who then later deceive you, leads to 
disappointment in love, and then disappointment again in court.  
Hasday argues for a new regime that would instead vindicate the losses 
of those individuals who trust their intimates, at least to the degree that 
non-intimates’ losses are vindicated when their trust is disappointed  
(p. 197, 200).  She proposes a rebuttable presumption in favor of treating 
intimates who bring claims based on deception the same way as non-
intimates bringing similar claims (p. 200). 
Hasday’s sympathies are plainly with the deceived.  More broadly, she 
prefers a legal regime that supports and rewards trust among intimates: 
No one should be faulted or legally penalized for acting as an ordinary per-
son would and trusting his intimates.  Both human psychology and social 
norms push us toward such trust, and faith in our intimates can help foster 
human flourishing, caregiving, cooperation, and social bonds.  The law 
should neither expect nor desire the end of trust within intimacy (p. 231). 
Trust is thus an important theme here.  Hasday does not foreground the 
term, though, and therefore does not define it. 
How one defines trust depends on the focus, as trust encompasses 
vastly different phenomena.  Dimensions include the object of the trust 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Hasday describes the “[v]olumes of social science research spanning decades [that] find that 
the odds that a person will accurately assess whether a speaker is being honest or lying hover only 
slightly above chance” (p. 52). 
 68 See, e.g., Timothy R. Levine, Truth-Default Theory (TDT): A Theory of Human Deception 
and Deception Detection, 33 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 378, 378–79 (2014); see also 
MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS 53–106 (2019). 
 69 In the ellipsis span, Hasday cites to United States v. Brown, 147 F.3d 477, 480–82, 487 (6th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 507–08 (7th Cir. 1996); 139 CONG. REC. 27,645 
(1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); id. at 18,057–59 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (p. 50 n.4).  
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(who or what is being trusted); the relevant time (whether trust concerns 
a positive or predictive matter); the scope of the trust (whether trust is 
absolute or qualified70); the direction of the trust (whether it is unidirec-
tional or multidirectional); and the content (the what of the trust71).  To 
understand the last, consider that you might trust someone to drive you 
somewhere, but not fly you to the same destination; one person to re-
move your tooth, but not to prepare your taxes.72 
Definitions that reflect the object, time, and directional dimensions 
are, for example, “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange 
will exploit the other’s vulnerability”73 and “choosing to risk making 
something you value vulnerable to another person’s actions.”74  Both of 
these definitions seem to focus on the relationship to one other person, 
with an eye toward future behavior.  By contrast, the following defini-
tion from Esther Perel demonstrates that trust can also be a more foun-
dational orientation of the individual: “Trust is also our ability to live 
with what we will never know.”75 
Perel’s definition also begins to point toward a central division I ex-
plore here: the cognitive (thinking) as opposed to the affective (feelings).  
Set against two rubrics along the time dimension, aspects of the affective 
and the cognitive can be mapped as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 Cf., e.g., Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 534–35 (1995). 
 71 This is related to a form of trust sometimes called “confidence.”  See, e.g., Michael Siegrist, 
Trust and Risk Perception: A Critical Review of the Literature, RISK ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 4), https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13325 [https://perma.cc/TX4J-QJ3W] (“[C]onfidence 
is based on past experiences or evidence suggesting that future events will occur as expected.”). 
 72 These examples were inspired by Adam Grant, How to Trust People You Don’t Like, Work-
Life with Adam Grant at 05:56, TED (March 2018), https://www.ted.com/talks/ 
worklife_with_adam_grant_how_to_trust_people_you_don_t_like [https://perma.cc/6M4B-SDCK]. 
 73 Charles F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile Economy, 
46 HUM. REL. 1133, 1133 (1993). 
 74 CHARLES FELTMAN, THE THIN BOOK OF TRUST 7 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
 75 Aly Weisman & Kristen Griffin, A Relationship Expert Explains “the Most Important Ele-
ment in a Relationship,” BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 5, 2016, 10:40 AM), https://www. 
businessinsider.com/most-important-thing-in-relationships-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/QZ2Y-RYQD] 
(quoting Esther Perel). 
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Table 1: Matrix of Two Central Aspects of Trust 
 
 Cognitive Affective 
 
Positive 
 
A belief in the current 
facts as given 
A feeling of safety and secu-
rity in a particular environ-
ment or relationship in this 
moment 
Predictive 
 
A belief that things will 
turn out ok 
An emotional security that 
things will turn out ok 
 
The aim at this point is not to select among these definitions or dimen-
sions, but to set the stage for inquiry into the nature and meanings of 
trust.  Trust, as we shall see, presents particular puzzles for the work of 
lawyers and researchers, as well as among intimates. 
To set up the framework I offer in Part III, this Part traces several 
themes and excavates important perspectives on both trust and distrust, 
including what builds trust; which sources we should trust; who gets to 
trust and be trusted; who is expected to distrust; and, finally, what kind 
of trust is expected of romantic partners.  This Part reaches far beyond 
the realm of intimate deception or even of intimate relationships.  The 
aim here is to delve broadly into the subject of trust, both to begin to 
understand this rich field and to lay the groundwork for the framework 
presented in the next Part and its application to Hasday’s proposals and 
other legal contexts. 
A.  Who Believes the Universe Is a Friendly Place? 
The most important decision we make is whether we believe we live 
in a friendly or hostile universe. 
— attributed to Albert Einstein76 
The quotation in the epigraph came into my mind while reading 
Hasday’s Intimate Lies and the Law.  I remembered hearing it attributed 
to Einstein in more than one yoga class.  The words are recited in that 
context, I gather, not to suggest the possibility of an alien invasion.  Ra-
ther, these words — assigned to a figure widely trusted for his brilliance — 
invite the listener to cultivate trust in place of anxiety or worry.77 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 Liz Sterling, Is It a Friendly Universe?, HUFFPOST (June 17, 2012, 9:18 AM), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/positive-thinking_b_1590903 [https://perma.cc/3JAF-ZA9V].  For 
more on the attribution, see infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 77 Trust here is meant more in the affective sense of feeling safe, rather than the ideological sense 
of, for instance, believing in a just world.  Cf. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World 
and Redistributive Politics 1–2, 24–26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11208, 
2005), https://www.nber.org/papers/w11208.pdf [https://perma.cc/89SZ-27AD] (proposing a model 
distinguishing an “American” equilibrium with high belief in a just world, motivation to work, and 
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Remembering this line led me to question whether it was really said 
by Einstein.  And then to ask the reference librarians if they could find 
the source of the quotation — whether from Einstein or elsewhere.78  
They sent back two conclusions: the line is frequently attributed to  
Einstein, and yet the source is almost certainly not Einstein.  (For those 
who are interested, this was most likely the poet and philologist F.W.H. 
Myers’s answer to a question, possibly asked by Matthew Arnold, about 
what question he’d most like answered.79)  This is far from the only 
wrongly attributed quotation-from-yoga-class.80 
How does it feel to be the person at the yoga class seeking to debunk 
the quotation attributions?  Not great.  This is generally not why you 
came to yoga: to feel skeptical and doubting.  Yet it happens to the best 
of us.  (And perhaps this response is apt, although unpleasant, when 
what’s offered is untrue.) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
laissez-faire policies, from a “European” equilibrium characterized by skepticism about whether effort 
is rewarded, less motivation to work, and a more robust welfare state; and drawing on the distinction 
between affect and belief); Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution 
Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1030 (1978) (“Individuals have a need 
to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve.”). 
 78 I framed my question as, “Would it be possible to find the source of this line attributed to 
Einstein?” 
 79 One retelling is as follows: 
An interesting story has been told of the friendship of Matthew Arnold, the English poet 
and critic, and F.W.H. Myers, the philosopher and spiritualist.  They had been conversing 
about man’s place in the universe, when suddenly Arnold turned to Myers and asked, “If 
you were permitted to ask one question of the Sphinx, with the assurance that a correct 
answer would be given, what question would you ask?”  After a moment’s reflection  
Myers replied, “I should ask, ‘Is the universe friendly?’” 
J. SUTHERLAND BONNELL, FIFTH AVENUE SERMONS 1 (1936).  Whether or not this is Matthew 
Arnold is subject to doubt, even from Bonnell, who wrote, “Whether this anecdote be true or not I 
cannot say.  Frankly, I have my doubts about many of these tag ends of biography.”  Id.   
Another source is EMIL CARL WILM, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION 114 n.1 (1912): 
A friend proposed to the late F.W.H. Myers the following question: “What is the thing 
which above all others you would like to know?  If you could ask the Sphinx one question, 
and only one, what would the question be?”  After a moment’s silence Myers replied: “I 
think it would be this: Is the universe friendly?” 
Thank you to Marty Witt and especially to Nam Jin Yoon for a deep dive to try to find the source 
of this line. 
 80 Another is the line frequently misattributed to Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl: “Between 
stimulus and response there is a space.  In that space is our power to choose our response.  In our 
response lies our growth and our freedom.”  See, e.g., Victor E. Frankl Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/viktor_e_frankl_160380 [https://perma.cc/8PVB-3D9C] 
(misattributing the quote to Frankl).  It looks like that line is possibly from self-help author Stephen 
Covey, or maybe from an unidentified book he once saw in Hawai‘i, or from some other source — 
but in any case not from Frankl.  See Franz J. Vesely, Alleged Quote, VIKTOR FRANKL INSTITUT, 
https://www.univie.ac.at/logotherapy/quote_stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/V3EM-T45V] (noting 
that the quotation is attributed to Frankl and referring readers to Stephen Covey’s account of find-
ing the quote in an unidentified source); see also Between Stimulus and Response There Is a Space. 
In That Space Is Our Power To Choose Our Response, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/02/18/response [https://perma.cc/22FM-GP5R]. 
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I suspect that many readers of this Review know something about 
what it’s like to be the resident debunker.  Lawyers, academics, and those 
training to be lawyers and academics have a special relationship to dis-
trust.  Lawyers are often expected to be the people in the room who antic-
ipate and guard against or neutralize the bad things that might happen.  
And academics are researchers who dig to get to the bottom of things, 
rather than trusting the first explanation or claim they encounter.  Trust 
seems like a good thing, but the special need for distrust for both lawyers 
and researchers highlights the virtues, in some contexts, of distrust. 
B.  Trust and the Inner Researcher, or, Self-Trust 
The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a 
reverence for our past act or word because the eyes of others have no 
other data for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath 
to disappoint them. . . .  A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. . . .  
Speak what you think now in hard words and to-morrow speak what to-
morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you 
said to-day. 
— Ralph Waldo Emerson81 
Researchers and scholars must distrust superficial answers.  And they 
must be prepared to do the work to reach further.  This raises the question 
of which facts to trust and how to decide — and whom to tell.  Strenuous 
research and reporting may also require a certain kind of trust, then: in 
the researcher’s own methods, observations, and conclusions. 
To trust one’s own perceptions sometimes involves a radical rejection 
of the facts or norms accepted by others or even one’s earlier self (as in 
the epigraph from Emerson).  We might think here of Galileo’s finding 
that the sun revolves around the earth — or of those who call out forms 
of injustice that have gone unseen or unchallenged.  A dramatic example 
of a researcher trusting her own perceptions and risking reputational 
consequences comes from Barbara Ehrenreich, in her 2016 book Living 
with a Wild God.82  Trained as a scientist,83 Ehrenreich is best known 
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 81 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance (1841), in NATURE AND SELECTED ESSAYS 
175, 182–83 (Penguin Classics 2003).  He continues: “‘Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunder-
stood.’ —  Is it so bad then to be misunderstood?  Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, 
and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit 
that ever took flesh.  To be great is to be misunderstood.”  Id. at 183. 
 82 BARBARA EHRENREICH, LIVING WITH A WILD GOD 115–16 (2016) [hereinafter 
EHRENREICH, WILD GOD]. 
 83 On her Ph.D. in cellular immunology from Rockefeller University, see, for example, Lucy 
Rock, When Do You Know You’re Old Enough to Die?  Barbara Ehrenreich Has Some Answers, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2018, 6:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/apr/ 
07/barbara-ehrenreich-natural-causes-book-old-enough-to-die [https://perma.cc/2WYN-BFW2]. 
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for hard-hitting journalism like Nickel and Dimed,84 which was based 
on her three-month experiment living on minimum-wage jobs like wait-
ress, hotel maid, and healthcare aid, among others.85  Ehrenreich has 
described herself as “a myth buster by trade.”86 
In Living with a Wild God, Ehrenreich recounts her experience as a 
young person in the desert seeing what appeared to be a vision of every-
thing in flames.87  She buried these memories for decades, not risking  
others’ reactions.88  “For most of the intervening years,” she writes, “my 
general thought has been: If there are no words for it, then don’t say any-
thing about it.”89  What she says next begins to convey her self-conscious-
ness about sharing this kind of experience, her appreciation of the norms 
she was violating and expectations she was disappointing: “Otherwise you 
risk slopping into ‘spirituality,’ which is, in addition to being a crime 
against reason, of no more interest to other people than your dreams.”90  
For many years, she distrusted her readers and protected her status as a 
trustworthy narrator by hiding parts of her experience. 
Although she kept these memories to herself, Ehrenreich saved the 
contemporaneous journals in which she described them, out of some 
sense that her inner researcher must stay true to the events as she expe-
rienced them — she couldn’t destroy the facts as they came to her.91  
The book recounts her decision finally to expose these memories to the 
world, despite the doubts she would face, not only of her story but of 
her self.  She chose to risk losing her readers’ trust in favor of her own 
perceptions.92 
Even the boldest of thinkers may choose not to risk his reputation by 
sharing ideas he trusts but expects the world will not.  Jeremy Bentham’s 
writings about same-sex sex are a relevant example.  Bentham couldn’t 
figure out any reason, under a principle of utility, for punishing sex with 
a person of the same sex.93  But he declined to share his writings on the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 84 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED (2001). 
 85 Id. at 9. 
 86 Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class at 08:12, BOOKNOTES (Oct. 8, 1989), 
http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/9435-1/Barbara-Ehrenreich.aspx [https://perma.cc/QX5M-CUYW]. 
 87 EHRENREICH, WILD GOD, supra note 82, at 115–16. 
 88 Id. at 119. 
 89 Id. at 115–16. 
 90 Id. at 116.   
 91 Id. at 122–24.  For the words she found for the experience, see id. at 116. 
 92 This does not appear to have happened, from a survey of prominent reviews, but one finds 
amidst them hints of what Ehrenreich might reasonably have feared.  See, e.g., Dwight Garner, 
Believe It or Not, a Skeptic’s Journey, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 15, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1eGV0Wf 
[https://perma.cc/L78N-QR4H] (asserting that “this book contains some of her loopiest writing”). 
 93 See Jeremy Bentham, Paederasty (1785), in Offences Against One’s Self: Paederasty, Part 1, 3 
J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389, 389 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978), and Jeremy Bentham’s Essay on  
“Paederasty,” Part 2, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 91, 93 (Louis Crompton ed., 1978).  Note that Ben-
tham defines “paederasty” here as simply an “impropriety” involving sex with “an object of the 
proper species but the wrong sex.”  Bentham, Paederasty, Part I, supra, at 389. 
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subject — declining even to include them among the papers to be pub-
lished on his death — knowing how discrediting they would be not only 
to him personally but also to the other causes on which he wrote.94   
Despite keeping these views private, Bentham did not destroy the manu-
scripts on the subject, trusting the value of his own ideas and preserving 
them for a future generation.  And those writings did in fact find a recep-
tive, even enthusiastic audience, centuries later.95 
This is of course sometimes why those who write do so.  Those whom 
writers trust to listen and connect with their perceptions may be at some 
distance across time and space — a distance the written word can 
travel.96  The prospect of words traveling, the possibility that they will 
last, is also one reason why writing can be hard.  A form of self-trust 
may be useful here too.  In her paean to “shitty first drafts,” Anne 
Lamott explains why she writes them: “For me and most of the other 
writers I know, writing is not rapturous.  In fact, the only way I can get 
anything written at all is to write really, really shitty first drafts.”97  By 
“writing without reining myself in . . . almost just typing, just making 
my fingers move,” she says, on a given day the writing itself can get her 
past doubt — “because by then I had been writing for so long, I would 
eventually let myself trust the process.”98  Trusting the process is, for 
Lamott, an avenue to self-trust.99 
In the epigraph, Emerson warns that expectations of consistency can 
undermine self-trust.100  Because others expect sameness, the tendency 
is to tell an identical story again and again — to stick, as they say, to the 
script.  Emerson’s observation is supported by recent work suggesting 
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 94 Bentham wrote of himself, in a précis of a project he imagined writing on the subject someday: 
[S]o it has happened, it has falled in his way to have been already, in a certain degree, 
useful to mankind: he is in a way to be still more so: and, in case of his being known to be 
the author of such a work, there is no saying to what a degree Every prospect of his future 
usefulness might, in his instance, be destroyed. 
Elizabeth Francis Emens, William Beckford: Sexuality and Reputation 32 (2000) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (quot-
ing University College London Bentham papers, Box 161a, fol. 14iii). 
 95 The third and fourth volumes of the Journal of Homosexuality published some of these writ-
ings by Bentham in 1978.  See Bentham, supra note 93. 
 96 For example, about the poem “To Pi Ssu Yao” by Tu Fu, Czeslaw Milosz writes, “Reading 
this poem I reflect upon the obstinacy of artists.  Whence comes our passion, our zeal, in working 
at the risk of possible loss?  Is this only ambition, or a bond with people who might come after us, 
some kind of love?”  A BOOK OF LUMINOUS THINGS 181 (Czeslaw Milosz ed., 1998).  Milosz was 
reflecting, presumably, on these lines from Tu Fu: “Our poems will be handed / Down along with 
great dead poets’. / We can console each other. / At least we shall have descendants.”  Tu Fu, To Pi 
Ssu Yao, in KENNETH REXROTH, ONE HUNDRED POEMS FROM THE CHINESE 15 (1971). 
 97 ANNE LAMOTT, BIRD BY BIRD: SOME INSTRUCTIONS ON WRITING AND LIFE 22 (1994). 
 98 Id. at 24–25. 
 99 Id. at 112 (“You need to trust yourself, especially on a first draft . . . .”). 
 100 See supra p. 1981. 
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that “predictability enhances trust.”101  What builds trust, as a psycho-
logical matter, may therefore discourage candor.  Emerson urges readers 
instead to speak their truth, though it changes with time.   
We are living in a moment when the question of whom and what to 
trust — what sources, both public and private — is especially fraught.  
I recently tried an online experiment involving a game to accomplish 
what the authors of the study call “pre-bunking.”102  The game teaches 
users how to create “fake news” and rile up energy and support among 
followers.103  The authors report that, after playing the game, people are 
better able to detect fake news.104  In a sense, the game teaches distrust; 
in another sense, perhaps, it teaches users how to trust themselves over 
the hype. 
Of course, self-trust can also lead a person astray.  Hasday observes 
that self-deception is probably the most common form of deception  
(p. 9).  As one example, people rarely believe themselves to harbor racial 
bias; instead, they trust their own biases.105  This brings us to the subject 
of identity’s role in trust and distrust. 
C.  Who Gets to Trust and Be Trusted, or,  
The Role of Power and Identity 
[W]hen we came to the United States, my mother said . . . you cannot 
trust white people. . . .  [E]very time you drive your car, you’re trusting 
everybody around you. 
— Claudia Rankine106 
Growing up as a privileged white child, I was raised not to trust and 
also to trust, in a combination I found confusing.  I grew up in a home 
with an alarm system, but when we vacationed in the woods during the 
summer we regularly left cabin doors unlocked, even at night.  I then 
perplexed my family, at a certain age, by wanting to lock the doors in 
summer.  Too many horror movies involving cabins in the woods had 
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 101 Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Rela-
tionships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 121 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996). 
 102 Fake News “Vaccine” Works: “Pre-Bunking” Game Reduces Susceptibility to Disinformation, 
EUREKALERT (June 24, 2019), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-06/uoc-fn062119.php 
[https://perma.cc/8SYU-JZMF]. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Jon Roozenbeek & Sander van der Linden, Fake News Game Confers Psychological Re-
sistance Against Online Misinformation, 5 PALGRAVE COMM. 1, 7 (2019). 
 105 Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group 
Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 111–12 (2002) 
(reporting on the gap between implicit bias and reported levels of explicit bias). 
 106 Claudia Rankine: How Can I Say This So We Can Stay in This Car Together?, ON BEING 
WITH KRISTA TIPPETT (Jan. 10, 2019), https://onbeing.org/programs/claudia-rankine-how-can-i-
say-this-so-we-can-stay-in-this-car-together-jan2019 [https://perma.cc/R2C5-U9N2].  
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planted images in my dreamscape.  Why, I wondered, wouldn’t you just 
lock them? 
In recent years, I have begun to see the appeal of unlocked doors 
even if I still lean on locks.  Open doors are inviting.  As Carl Sandburg 
writes, “An open door says, ‘Come in.’ / A shut door says, ‘Who are 
you?’”107  Perhaps even more, presuming that those who enter pose no 
threat, and can be trusted, may be comforting — as is the belief that no 
one unwanted would ever try to enter.  There is a leap of faith that can 
feel good to take, when you don’t lock your doors, when you don’t take 
precautions.  If you can do it. 
Yet some of us are denied the privilege of trust. 
Professor Patricia Williams famously recounted a racialized experi-
ence of trust and distrust in apartment hunting.  While co-teaching  
Contracts, she and a white male colleague, Professor Peter Gabel, each 
went looking for a sublet, which “inevitably” turned into  “a discussion 
of trust and distrust as factors in bargain relations.”108  Williams was 
surprised by Gabel’s trust of strangers: 
It turned out that Peter had handed over a $900 deposit in cash, with no 
lease, no exchange of keys, and no receipt, to strangers with whom he had 
no ties other than a few moments of pleasant conversation.  He said he 
didn’t need to sign a lease because it imposed too much formality.  The 
handshake and the good vibes were for him indicators of trust more binding 
than a form contract.  At the time I told Peter he was mad, but his faith 
paid off.  His sublessors showed up at the appointed time, keys in hand, to 
welcome him in.109 
Williams, by contrast, in a “rush to show good faith and trustworthiness” 
to the “friends who found [her] an apartment in a building they owned,” 
had “signed a detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease firmly 
establishing [her] as the ideal arm’s-length transactor.”110 
For Williams, the formalities were not superficial or precautionary.  
They were the foundation of trust: 
I was raised to be acutely conscious of the likelihood that no matter what 
degree of professional I am, people will greet and dismiss my black female-
ness as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational, and 
probably destitute.  Futility and despair are very real parts of my response.  
So it helps me to clarify boundary; to show that I can speak the language 
of lease is my way of enhancing trust of me in my business affairs.111 
That boundary seems to solidify Williams, to ground her, in support of 
her own as well as the other’s trust. 
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 107 CARL SANDBURG, Doors, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF CARL SANDBURG 654 (1970). 
 108 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146 (1991). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 147. 
 111 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Williams observed that she and Gabel were seeking similar outcomes 
with opposite approaches: 
We both wanted to establish enduring relationships with the people in 
whose houses we would be living; we both wanted to enhance trust of our-
selves and to allow whatever closeness was possible.  This similarity of de-
sire, however, could not reconcile our very different relations to the tonalities 
of law.112 
A history of racialized interactions meant that for Gabel a lack of for-
malities signaled trust — layers of extralegal constraints were on his 
side113 — whereas for Williams the legal formalities seemed the best 
chance of overcoming distrust.  Formalities seemed a pathway to being 
trusted, as well as to building mutual trust. 
Legal formalities may be better than a handshake for those lacking 
the social privilege of informal enforcement, as Williams observes, but 
those formalities nonetheless offer scant protection in many contexts, 
leading to well-documented community-wide distrust.  Consider, for  
example, blue-on-black police encounters.114  In discussions of police 
violence and killings of people of color, scholars may reach for some 
scaffolding.  Warnings, someone will propose, are an answer — perhaps 
warnings will enable communication during police encounters, dialogue 
about threat and consequences.115  Perhaps warnings will prevent so 
many senseless deaths.  Others contend that warnings offer no such scaf-
folding.116  And yet textured ethnographic work suggests that “situa-
tional trust” in police may exist,117 even in communities whose relation 
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 112 Id. 
 113 Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 685 (1986) (“In rural Shasta County, California, residents . . . typi-
cally look to informal norms to determine their entitlements in animal trespass situations.”); Rose, 
supra note 70, at 537–41 (describing the view that trust may be supported by a lack of formalities 
or monitoring). 
 114 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help 
the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 238 & n.28 (2008); Tom 
R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the 
Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 332–33 (2005); see also Sandra Susan Smith, Race and Trust, 36 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 453, 456, 458 (2010). 
 115 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Ending Excessive Police Force Starts with New 
Rules of Engagement, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2014), http://wapo.st/1xlSkvp [https://perma.cc/UG82-
6URB]. 
 116 See, e.g., Roseanna Sommers & Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: 
Consent Searches and the Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1962, 2015 (2019); see also Yale 
Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Need It, How We Got It — 
And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 177–78 (2007). 
 117 Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive Legal Cynicism, 
50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 314, 316 (2016). 
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to the law is characterized as “legal estrangement,”118 and that reforms 
may be built upon this.119 
Claudia Rankine, author of the prose-poem Citizen,120 which gave 
narrative voice to racial microaggressions (and macroaggressions), re-
counts her mother telling her, after their family moved to the United 
States from Jamaica, “you cannot trust white people.”121  Rankine ob-
serves, however, that we all need trust to go about our daily lives: 
“[E]very time you drive your car, you’re trusting everybody around 
you.”122  She therefore keeps searching for some words to help us begin 
to communicate. “I spend a lot of time thinking about, how can I say 
this so that we can stay in this car together, and yet explore the things 
that I want to explore with you?”123 
* * * 
The disparate access and racialized impediments to trust remain a 
pressing and unresolved problem in the middle of this discussion of trust 
and the law.  The subject also points toward a lacuna in the frequent 
public rhetoric about increasing trust: scholars and politicians of many 
stripes have sought ways to build trust in the police in predominantly 
African American neighborhoods.124  But as Professor Onora O’Neill 
sagely reminds us, “Trust is valuable only when directed to [objects] that 
are trustworthy.”125  How much good — or rather, how much bad — is 
done by persuading people to trust an authority that does not warrant 
their trust?  Institutions must become trustworthy before people are 
asked to trust them.126 
In the intimate realm, Hasday tells us that courts are no longer sym-
pathetic to racial disappointment in intimacy as grounds for a lawsuit 
(pp. 121–24).127  And Hasday, in proposing that courts become generally 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 
2054, 2066 (2017). 
 119 Id. at 2126–49. 
 120 CLAUDIA RANKINE, CITIZEN: AN AMERICAN LYRIC (2014). 
 121 Claudia Rankine: How Can I Say This So We Can Stay in This Car Together?, supra note 106. 
 122 Id. (emphasis added). 
 123 Id. 
 124 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 118, at 2058–59 (discussing this literature, with special reference to 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 9–11 (2015)). 
 125 Onora O’Neill, Linking Trust to Trustworthiness, 26 INT’L J. PHIL. STUD. 293, 293 (2018); 
see also Russell Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOC’Y 505, 512 (1993). 
 126 Cf., e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 
81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 367–68 (2001) (“The key to creating trust is to act in ways that community 
residents will experience to be fair. . . .  If authorities use fair procedures, their motives are judged 
to be more trustworthy.”).  
 127 Cf. Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, Reproductive Freedom and 
the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6–7, 57).  
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more sympathetic to claims of intimate deception, is not urging a revival 
of these suits.  Getting courts out of the business of bolstering civil suits 
grounded in racial subordination is progress.  But pulling the law that 
supports discrimination out of these areas is likely to have limited im-
pact in actually supporting interracial intimacy, given the multiple ways 
that our relationships are shaped by legal architecture, as discussed ear-
lier.  The legal architecture of intimacy factors into interracial trust both 
within and beyond intimate relationships.128 
D.  Who Must Build Trust and Manage Distrust 
We believe, when we let ourselves, that there are things we can trust, 
people we can care for, words we can say in earnest. 
— Jedediah Purdy129 
The previous section has pointed to the difficulty of trusting and 
being trusted — and the differences among people, across identity and 
social role, in both.  With that recognition as backdrop, the epigraph 
from Professor Jedediah Purdy turns us toward the possibilities for trust, 
the human longing for it.  And this section briefly considers the special 
role of lawyers in acting as agents for important forms of trust as well 
as distrust. 
Lawyers are required to distrust the facts as given — or at least not 
merely trust them.  When a death penalty lawyer listens to her client, 
for example, she cannot accept everything said at face value.  Under 
ABA guidelines, effective and vigorous representation requires the  
lawyer to listen and investigate thoroughly,130 which may mean inter-
viewing certain witnesses despite a client’s request to the contrary.131  
Transactional lawyers must also anticipate the worst.  They take the 
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 128 See Emens, supra note 51, at 1393–96 (discussing the “architecture of intimacy”). 
 129 JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS, at xv (1999).  Purdy is writing in a different 
context, and the preceding lines are these: “I do not believe that, even when it is strongest, irony 
has convinced us that nothing is real, true, or ours.”  Id. 
 130 AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES guideline 10.7 (2003) [hereinafter ABA 
GUIDELINES], reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1015 (2003); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, 
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES, reprinted in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 689 (2008). 
 131 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 130, guideline 10.7, at 1015 (“The investigation regarding pen-
alty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing upon pen-
alty is not to be collected or presented.”); id. commentary to guideline 10.7, at 1021 (“Counsel cannot 
responsibly advise a client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make 
informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client’s competency to make such decisions, 
unless counsel has first conducted a thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case.”  
(citation omitted)).  As noted there, “in capital cases, the mental vulnerabilities of a large portion of 
the client population compound the possibilities for error.”  Id. commentary to guideline 10.7, at 
1017.  I thank Alexis Hoag for this point. 
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deal struck by the principals, think up what could go wrong, and create 
language to address those possibilities. 
More generally, the livelihood of many lawyers might be said to de-
pend on distrust.  This likely contributes to the stereotypes and negative 
attitudes toward lawyers.  In the words of one non-lawyer, a world of 
perfect trust might well mean “the elimination of mountains of paper-
work and half the legal profession.”132 
Alongside these expectations of distrust, lawyers are also required to 
build trust.  They must build relationships with clients, facilitate nego-
tiations with hostile parties, persuade judges to believe their arguments, 
work in teams to achieve common goals in litigation, corporate law, and 
other domains — to name a few examples of ways lawyers need trust.133  
Professor Susan Sturm has persuasively diagnosed the tension between 
these two demands on lawyers — to investigate skeptically and to build 
trust — as a lawyering paradox.134 
Lawyers may at times have the capacity to act as agents of both trust 
and distrust on behalf of their clients.135  They may be able to build 
affective bridges across conflict, where the client’s history and emotions 
preclude even the trust necessary to sit in the same room with an adver-
sary.  And a lawyer may also be able to prevent emotions from hindering 
the ability to inquire, to ask, to investigate, to look for the facts behind 
the drama (positive or negative). 
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 132 SHIMON APISDORF, ROSH HASHANAH YOM KIPPUR SURVIVAL KIT 73 (1992) (“Imagine 
a world where contracts didn’t have to be signed.  Where a person’s word was ‘as good as gold’ 
and a handshake was a done deal.  Imagine if people actually lived with that kind of trust in one 
another.  Imagine the integrity.  Beyond the elimination of mountains of paperwork and half the 
legal profession, it would be a different world.”); see also Rose, supra note 70, at 531 (“Lawyers do 
not have much of a reputation for fostering trust.  We insist that ordinary people get everything 
down on paper, thereby sowing seeds of discord and suspicion . . . .”). 
 133 See, e.g., Jay Quam, Adversarial Advocacy: Too Much Adversity Can Hurt You, BENCH & B. 
MINN., Apr. 2011, at 22, 24; Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807, 
848–51 (2017); Gretchen Viney, Using the Fee Agreement to Build Client Rapport, WIS. LAW., Nov. 
2013, at 11, 13; Paul R. Williams & Christin Coaster, #Lawyeringpeace: The Role of Lawyers in 
Peacebuilding, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493, 497 (2016).  Lawyers may also conceive of build-
ing trust as not merely instrumental but as central to the relational aspect of zealous advocacy.  See 
generally Remus, supra, at 849–50.  I thank Colleen Shanahan for this point.  
 134 Susan P. Sturm, Lawyering Paradoxes: Making Meaning of the Contradictions 20–34 (Columbia 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14–6432, 2019), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_ 
scholarship/2579 [https://perma.cc/5SXH-E3SQ]. 
 135 See, e.g., Susan Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Reflecting on the Habits: Teaching About Identity, 
Culture, Language, and Difference, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS 349, 365 
(Susan Bryant, Elliott S. Milstein & Ann C. Shalleck eds., 2014) (describing the interplay between 
the “methodological doubt” and “methodological belief” lawyers need to practice); cf., e.g., Jennifer 
Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing 
Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 175–76 (2015) (suggesting that shifting responsibility 
to agents — such as lawyers — can help individuals engage in transactions that their emotions may 
otherwise prevent them from engaging in). 
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Think again of John Dahl and his sister Dorothy Zauhar who 
brought suit against the man who accepted Dahl’s kidney donation, 
while engaged to Zauhar, then promptly cancelled the wedding.  Brother 
and sister were both alleging a painful betrayal — emotionally for each, 
in different ways, and physically for Dahl.136  The need to build trust as 
well as gather facts would be — or should be — apparent to a lawyer 
meeting with these plaintiffs.  As Hasday reports, individuals whose  
intimates have lied to them in consequential ways often report the chal-
lenge of trusting again (p. 91).137  “Many people have stressed how dev-
astating losing trust in a deceitful intimate can be,” she writes (p. 90).  
In one victim’s words, a betrayal can be “trust-shattering” (p. 90).138 
E.  Mythic Trust, or, “Trust . . . Then Jump” 
Do you trust me? . . .  Then jump! 
— Aladdin139 
How did the plaintiffs in Dahl v. McNutt,140 Dorothy Zauhar and 
her brother, end up in this predicament?  The affections of Zauhar’s 
fiancé, Harvard-educated businessman Richard McNutt, had fluctuated 
over time, as discussed earlier.141  Once a kidney donation from her 
brother looked promising, they set a date for the wedding.142  Consider 
Zauhar’s position.  Could she have said to McNutt at this point, Yes! 
I’ll marry you!, while also allowing herself to think, Is it possible you’re 
proposing to marry me just because you want a kidney from me or my 
brother? 
Several psychological heuristics — mental shortcuts — could inhibit 
Zauhar’s ability to detect McNutt’s apparent deceit.  The truth default, 
mentioned earlier, means people tend to assume others are telling the 
truth (pp. 53–54).143  Confirmation bias, Hasday notes, leads people to 
assimilate new information to existing narratives or beliefs (p. 53).  In 
addition, because of optimism bias, people tend to expect that good 
things rather than bad will happen to them.144  (What happens to the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 136 Again, these facts follow the plaintiffs’ version.  See supra note 9. 
 137 Hasday recounts one man’s description of “the cruel dilemma confronting deceived intimates 
after the truth emerges: ‘On the one hand, we’ve learned some very difficult but valuable lessons 
about trusting others. But, the negative side is that too much distrust can prevent us from ever 
developing a loving relationship again’” (p. 91). 
 138 The author quotes BONNIE EAKER WEIL, FINANCIAL INFIDELITY 148 (2008). 
 139 ALADDIN: THE COMPLETE SCRIPT (compiled by Ben Scripps), http://www.fpx.de/fp/ 
Disney/Scripts/Aladdin.txt [https://perma.cc/9WM9-9ZU2]. 
 140 No. C3-97-601906, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998). 
 141 See supra p. 1976. 
 142 Complaint at 5, Dahl, No. C3-97-601906 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 143 See note 38 and accompanying text.  
 144 See, e.g., TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS, at xi–xvi (2011).  Hasday doesn’t discuss 
optimism bias, but does note that existing research “suggest[s] that people are more likely to believe 
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plaintiffs in this case, if their account is to be believed, would be quite 
a bad thing to imagine was happening.) 
In addition to these and other heuristics, trusting in a romantic con-
text is shrouded in a kind of narrative mythology, vividly rendered in 
the classic Disney movie Aladdin,145 quoted in the epigraph.  Early in 
the movie, a near stranger holds out his hand to Princess Jasmine and 
asks, “Do you trust me?”146  She hesitates at first, saying, “What?”147  
The stranger, Aladdin, repeats the question, “Do you trust me?”148  
“Yes,” she says, taking his hand, as they stand at a precipice.149  “Then 
jump!” he calls out, as they jump down many stories to (what turns out 
to be) a safe landing.150  Aladdin’s invitation to trust him is repeated 
again later.151  Each time, she trusts.152  Each time, that moment of trust 
builds their romance.153 
What if Princess Jasmine had responded, Let me talk to my lawyer 
first?  Or, Let me hire a private investigator to check out if you’re really 
who you say you are.  Investigating your intimates and prospective in-
timates, Hasday points out, is terrifically hard, as a practical matter (pp. 
59–64).  It is also normatively discouraged by cultural understandings 
of romance and love,154 as Aladdin showcases, reflecting a mythology of 
love and “blind trust”155 as intertwined.  Trust-then-jump represents 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
deception that flatters them, deception that is designed to ingratiate, and/or deception that they 
want to believe is true” (p. 54 (citation omitted)). 
 145 ALADDIN (Walt Disney Pictures 1992). 
 146 ALADDIN: THE COMPLETE SCRIPT, supra note 139. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. (emphasis added). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 The film arguably warrants a close reading beyond the scope of this Review, but a few notes 
follow: Aladdin also deceives Jasmine, pretending to be a prince to get past a rule that says the 
princess must marry a prince.  (At first we might say he actually becomes a prince, through the 
magic of the genie which is real within their fictional world, but when she begins to ask him ques-
tions about his identity, he then builds up lies about himself to support the genie’s magic.)  When 
she finds out about his fabrication, she is angry.  But then he saves her again, and they convince 
the sultan to change the law so that, ultimately, they can in fact marry.  Moreover, Jasmine deceives 
Aladdin, as well, from the first moment they meet, when she is disguised as a commoner.  So de-
ception and moving past it is a dance they both lead, though he for much longer. 
 154 Questioning others’ truthfulness is also disliked and discouraged by social norms more gen-
erally.  See, e.g., Rose, supra note 70, at 540. 
 155 I put “blind trust” in quotation marks to mark it as a phrase with a history and to signify 
concern with its use of blindness as a metaphor.  Disability metaphors typically draw on a long 
history of negative stereotypes and ignorant assumptions about what the actual disabilities entail.  
For further discussions, see generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 30–40 (1993); Elizabeth F. Emens, 
What’s Left in Her Wake: In Honor of Adrienne Asch, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at 
19, 20; Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg, Doing Social Justice: 10 Reasons to Give up Ableist Language, 
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love as “a leap of faith.”156  The anti-rational quality of this leap is ac-
centuated in the Broadway version of Aladdin, where Princess Jasmine 
inserts one further phrase in her response to Aladdin’s invitation to 
trust: “I’m not sure why,” she observes, “but . . . yes.”157 
* * * 
Though hard numbers are elusive, existing data suggest that rela-
tively few people sign prenuptial agreements.158  This is unsurprising.  
Prenups address what happens if the marriage fails, and those on the 
brink of marriage don’t want to plan for failure.  But declining to rec-
ognize that marriage exists “under the shadow of divorce” means taking 
a significant risk.159 
The eyes-wide-shut approach to big decisions may be a recipe for the 
kinds of disappointment Hasday’s book catalogues.160  And yet a feeling 
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HUFFPOST (June 10, 2014, 6:58 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/doing-social-justice-
thou_b_5476271 [https://perma.cc/JN3H-6NCX]. 
 156 The phrase “leap of faith” — commonly (and perhaps erroneously) thought to be coined by 
Søren Kierkegaard writing in a very different context, see Richard Schacht, Kierkegaard on “Truth 
is Subjectivity” and “The Leap of Faith,” 2 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 297, 306 (1973) — has arguably 
become a cliché about romantic love.  See, e.g., Maureen Lee Lenker, All the Rom-Com Clichés We 
Love in Netflix’s Falling Inn Love, ENT. WKLY. (Aug. 30, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://ew.com/ 
movies/2019/08/30/rom-com-cliches-falling-inn-love [https://perma.cc/T5VE-NAFR] (“Romance is 
often about taking a leap of faith — for another person or possibly yourself.”). 
 157 A Whole New World Lyrics — Aladdin, ALL MUSICALS, https://www.allmusicals.com/ 
lyrics/aladdin/awholenewworld.htm [https://perma.cc/RB3M-L6W9]. 
 158 This is stated tentatively because definitive data on this point are lacking.  Some sources say very 
few people sign prenups, citing a figure of five percent, but without a verifiable empirical source.  See, 
e.g., Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 887, 891 (1997); see also Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, MONEY (May 1996), 
https://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/1996/05/01/212090/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C573-EPC9] (stating that approximately 50,000 prenuptial agreements are signed each 
year).  Other sources say that prenups are increasing in some populations, for instance among millennials, 
or among those entering second marriages; one professional organization reports that sixty-two percent 
of matrimonial lawyers surveyed in 2016 reported an increase in prenups, but without attempting to 
estimate a base rate in the population.  Prenuptial Agreements on the Rise Finds Survey, CISION PR 
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28, 2016, 10:32 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/prenuptial- 
agreements-on-the-rise-finds-survey-300353444.html [https://perma.cc/PA99-QY62]; see also Susan 
Shain, The Rise of the Millennial Prenup, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2IYhSWo 
[https://perma.cc/B2TF-SMRA]; Geoff Williams, The Pros and Cons of Prenups, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/family-finance/articles/2018-08-
03/the-pros-and-cons-of-prenups [https://perma.cc/5QCL-2L73]. 
 159 Jeannie Suk Gersen, What “Divorce” Understands About Marriage, NEW YORKER (Oct. 16, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-divorce-understands-about-marriage 
[https://perma.cc/JF6K-Q8BJ]. 
 160 Note that this mythic norm of “trust then jump” entails complex gender dynamics, which 
warrant more involved discussion than this Review allows.  It is worth noting, though, that the 
norm is not necessarily symmetrical along the directional dimension of trust.  Norms for women 
seem to involve more expectations of unquestioning trust, whereas a certain archetypal vision of 
male love involves jealousy that may entail suspicion rather than trust.  See, e.g., Victoria E. Collins 
& Dianne C. Carmody, Deadly Love: Images of Dating Violence in the “Twilight Saga,” 26 AFFILIA 
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of trust seems vital to forward motion on such occasions.  The next Part 
suggests a framework for navigating this tension. 
III.  TRUSTING WITH EYES WIDE OPEN 
O, love’s best habit is in seeming trust 
— William Shakespeare161 
In this Part, I offer a pathway through the competing values of trust 
and distrust, drawing strengths from each to propose a combination of 
affective trust and cognitive distrust or curiosity.  I then apply this 
framework to Intimate Lies and the Law, using it to evaluate Hasday’s 
proposals for reform and present a further refinement of the central nor-
mative argument.  Next, I apply the framework to a recent legal devel-
opment relevant to intimate relationships: the New Mexico Supreme 
Court’s decision to abolish the marital confidences privilege.  Lastly, I 
apply the framework of trust and curiosity to devise a new approach to 
prenuptial agreements. 
A.  Mapping Trust 
I have no special talents, I am only passionately curious. 
— Albert Einstein (for real this time)162 
Trusting too much, too freely, is dangerous.  Unpacking that prob-
lematic phrase “blind trust” helps us understand the danger.  The phrase 
implies trust that is ignorant.  A person engaging in blind trust is closing 
her eyes to reality, declining to see the facts before her.  Blind trust is 
stupid trust.  (This example nicely shows the problem with common 
disability metaphors; they often reflect or contribute to erroneous stere-
otypes, like the idea that blind people are stupid.163)  The central point 
here, though, is this: intelligent living requires distrust. 
And yet failing to trust is arguably more dangerous.  Ours is a social 
world.  No man is an island.164  The basics of life in modern society 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
382, 388 (2011) (finding twenty-nine of thirty-one instances of jealousy in the Twilight book series 
to be jealousy by male characters directed at the female protagonist).  More egalitarian visions of 
romantic love seem instead to emphasize trust on both sides, however. 
 161 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 138, in THE YALE SHAKESPEARE: SHAKESPEARE’S 
SONNETS 69 (Edward Bliss Reed ed., 1923).  
 162 “Ich habe keine besondere Begabung, sondern bin nur leidenschaftlich neugierig.”  Letter from 
Albert Einstein to Carl Seelig (Mar. 11, 1952), http://www.library.ethz.ch/en/Ressourcen/ 
Digitale-Bibliothek/Einstein-Online/Princeton-1933-1955 [https://perma.cc/4PTP-57WW].  With 
thanks to Nam Jin Yoon for locating the letter and Professor Adam Tooze for confirming the translation. 
 163 See supra note 155. 
 164 JOHN DONNE, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS, AND 
SEVERAL STEPS IN MY SICKNES 193, 195 (D.A. Talboys ed., Oxford 1841) (1624); see Annette 
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 235–36, 241 (1986). 
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require coordination on both a small and large scale.165  And this is 
especially true in intimate relationships, which generally involve a de-
gree of caregiving and interdependency.  In our lives, major and minor 
outcomes depend on relationships, which depend on trust.166 
We thus need some measure of both trust and distrust.  Professor 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit has observed that trust and distrust are not 
precise opposites.167  They need not necessarily be so.  What we need, I 
would venture, are asymmetrical aspects of each. 
We would do well to combine affective trust with cognitive distrust.  
Although the distinction commonly drawn between feeling (affective) 
and thinking (cognitive) is inadequate if not entirely artificial,168 these 
categories provide a useful heuristic to organize and describe experience, 
as this section will show. 
Affective trust is emotional trust.  This is the feeling state of connec-
tion, of safety.169  Affective trust for another person is feeling safe in 
their presence, in their concern for you.  If the trust is mutual, then the 
other person also feels safe with you.  You can trust a physical space (as 
in, I feel safe here).  And affective trust need have no direct object at all.  
A person can simply feel trusting (as in, I feel the universe is a friendly 
place).  A general state of affective trust might well be understood as the 
opposite of anxiety.  And an “act of trust” may be an act rooted — in 
reality or aspirationally — in the feeling of safety with another, an emo-
tional security that the person will protect rather than exploit or harm 
you in your vulnerability. 
Cognitive distrust, by contrast, is mental inquiry.  This is an active 
state of inquiring into the facts, to find the truth.  Cognitive distrust means 
declining to take things for granted — not accepting the superficial 
presentation of reality.  This means embracing what is true over what you 
want to believe.170  The poet Galway Kinnell writes, “Whatever / what is 
is is what / I want.  Only that.  But that.”171  Cognitive distrust involves 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 70, at 531–32. 
 166 See, e.g., Hardin, supra note 125, at 507. 
 167 Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Trust, Distrust, and In Between, in DISTRUST 60, 61–62 (Russell 
Hardin ed., 2004). 
 168 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 34 (2001) (“[T]he cognitive elements are an essential part of the emotion’s identity, and 
of what differentiates one emotion from other emotions.”); see also id. at 19-294 (setting out a “cog-
nitive-evaluative” view of emotions); cf., e.g., George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 270–71 (2001) (“[F]eelings about risk and cognitive risk perceptions often 
diverge, sometimes strikingly.”  Id. at 271.). 
 169 Cf., e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF 
THE EMOTIONS 47–53 (1988). 
 170 This is not to say that what is true is necessarily found through the cognitive.  Indeed, a 
certain kind of thinking can get in the way of other kinds of knowledge, for instance, somatic 
knowledge.  See, e.g., LAMOTT,  supra note 97, at 110–15.   
 171 GALWAY KINNELL, Prayer, in COLLECTED POEMS 343, 343 (2017). 
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facing reality, not hiding from it.  And if the truth is not apparent once you 
open your eyes to it, then cognitive distrust also means a readiness to dig 
to the bottom of things, to find what’s really there. 
The two in combination overlap with what Professor Carol Rose de-
scribes as semi-rational trust — “a trust that asks for assurances and 
monitoring.”172  But disaggregating the emotional feeling of trust from 
the cognitive thinking of trust (or distrust) enables a departure from the 
hierarchy of real and unreal trust that Rose sets up.  For Rose, charac-
terizing the common view, “‘real’ or ‘true’ trust is a kind of confidence 
that does not even ask for good grounds” and so “there is no such thing 
as rational trust.”173  Her semi-rational trust — which is “a doubting or 
suspicious trust” — “is something less than this ‘real’ trust.”174  By con-
trast, I want to propose that emotional trust and cognitive trust exist on 
equal footing and can be present or absent in various combinations. 
The stories in Intimate Lies and the Law suggest the importance of 
the combination of affective trust and cognitive distrust.  With this pair-
ing, people can do the cognitive inquiring into the bad things that could 
happen and how to address them — while emotionally not going 
through the anxious suffering of feeling unmoored.  Stepping up to in-
quire need not require abandoning a feeling of safety. 
To represent a client or conduct a negotiation, a lawyer needs to an-
ticipate what might go wrong and to guard against it.  Yet a lawyer who 
approaches these tasks with affective distrust may reduce the prospect 
for collaboration through emotional contagion,175 among other burdens.  
Thus, affective trust combined with the cognitive distrust could be a 
path forward in negotiations — and in getting to sleep at night.  Here, 
one can do the right amount of due diligence as a cognitive matter — 
which (sometimes) requires anticipating bad things that might happen, 
thinking about what should be done to guard against them, and doing 
the right amount of those things — but without the affective worry. 
One difficult question is whether it’s possible to hold these two po-
sitions — affective trust and cognitive distrust — at the same time.  
Keats tells us that “Negative Capability” — which has often been inter-
preted to mean the ability to hold two conflicting ideas in productive 
tension176 — is characteristic of the “Man of Achievement,”177 but what 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 172 Rose, supra note 70, at 535. 
 173 Id. at 534. 
 174 Id. at 535 (third emphasis added). 
 175 Cf., e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, 
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 430–35 (2006) (explaining emotional contagion and citing sources). 
 176 Nathan Comfort Starr, Negative Capability in Keats’s Diction, 15 KEATS-SHELLEY J. 59, 59 
(1996). 
 177 In Keats’s original description, negative capability is a bit different: “Negative Capability, that 
is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason.”  Letter from John Keats to George & Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), in THE 
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about the rest of us?  Some encouragement may be found in the content 
dimension of trust discussed earlier: if we don’t trust everyone for all 
things, then even in the closest of relationships, there are some areas 
already characterized by a lack of trust.  For instance, a poet might trust 
her husband to cook dinner but not to edit her work. 
Even if we can begin to find avenues to support the prospect of a 
dynamic tension between affective trust and cognitive distrust, the mere 
word distrust seems to cut against the feeling of trust.  An alternative 
and better frame for cognitive distrust, then, may be curiosity. 
Curiosity might be understood as a warm version of cognitive dis-
trust.  Empirical and philosophical writings on curiosity identify multi-
ple subspecies.  William James, among others, has divided the world of 
curiosity into “two instinctive types.”178  The first is a kind of sensory-
seeking excitability.179  The second is the important one here: “scientific 
(i.e., cognitive) curiosity”180 — or what James described as “the impulse 
toward completer knowledge.”181  In this type of curiosity, “the actual 
ways humans conceive of objects act as stimuli and sensitize them to 
knowledge gaps, which, when resolved, result in feelings of pleasure and 
facilitate the storage of scientific knowledge.”182  In James’s words, “The 
philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a gap in its knowledge, 
just as the musical brain responds to a discord in what it hears.”183   
Similarly, John Dewey described intellectual curiosity as the “interest in 
problems provoked by the observation of things and the accumulation 
of material.”184  Empirical investigation confirms that curiosity does ap-
pear to comprise several subspecies,185 including cognitive curiosity or 
what Professor Daniel Berlyne called, in his classic article on the subject, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF KEATS 277 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1899).  The perva-
siveness of the interpretation I give in the body text signals the perceived elusiveness of the quality 
so understood as well. 
 178 Thomas G. Reio Jr. et al., The Measurement and Conceptualization of Curiosity, 167 J. 
GENETIC PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2006) (citing WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGY (Dover Publications 1950) (1890) [hereinafter JAMES, PRINCIPLES]); see also 
WILLIAM JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND TO STUDENTS ON SOME OF 
LIFE’S IDEALS 24–25 (Dover Publications 1962) (1899) [hereinafter JAMES, TALKS TO 
TEACHERS] (describing the two types in lively terms). 
 179 See JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS, supra note 178, at 24–25; Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119. 
 180 Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119. 
 181 JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS, supra note 178, at 24. 
 182 Reio et al., supra note 178, at 119. 
 183 2 JAMES, PRINCIPLES, supra note 178, at 430. 
 184 JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 33 (1910) (emphasis omitted). 
 185 See, e.g., George Loewenstein, The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation, 
116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75, 77–78, 83 (1994); Litman, supra note 14, at 422–24. 
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“epistemic curiosity.”186  More recently, epistemic curiosity has been de-
fined as “the motive to seek, obtain and make use of new knowledge.”187 
Epistemic curiosity has become the focus of a growing field of social 
scientific inquiry — a site of great curiosity, it might be said.  And it has 
been subdivided into two types: “interest” and “deprivation” curiosity.188  
Interest curiosity involves “a desire for new information anticipated to in-
crease pleasurable feelings of situational interest.”189  This type is “associ-
ated with an open, positive approach towards learning, implying a 
broadly optimistic outlook regarding new discoveries”190 — or, as vividly 
rendered by Professor Judson Brewer, “that wide-eyed wonder that draws 
us to explore.”191  Deprivation curiosity, by contrast, involves “striving to 
fill bothersome knowledge-gaps.”192  Such states “are theorized to resem-
ble a ‘need-like’ condition, involving unpleasant feelings of tension and 
perplexity, which increase until satisfactorily resolved”193 — in other 
words, “that restless need to know itch.”194  Although deprivation curios-
ity has been described as more “closed,” compared to interest curiosity, the 
two forms of epistemic curiosity are correlated,195 and both involve an 
active engagement in information seeking. 
More generally, the overarching rubric of epistemic curiosity, like 
cognitive distrust, suggests an orientation toward learning rather than 
assuming.  The term curiosity connotes a more positive affect than does 
the term distrust, so it seems more apt for pairing with affective trust.  
Moreover, the descriptor epistemic admits of more types of knowledge 
than does cognitive, so it better captures the forms of knowing people 
need to protect themselves.196 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 186 D.E. Berlyne, A Theory of Human Curiosity, 45 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 180, 180 (1954).  There 
is a rising tide of research on curiosity that may, before long, spur evolution in the current typology.  
See, e.g., Celeste Kidd & Benjamin Y. Hayden, The Psychology and Neuroscience of Curiosity, 88 
NEURON 449, 457 (2015) (“[W]e anticipate that, although useful in the past, Berlyne’s categories 
will be replaced with other, differently formulated subtypes and that these newer ones will be mo-
tivated by new neural and developmental data.”). 
 187 Marco Lauriola et al., Epistemic Curiosity and Self-Regulation, 83 PERSONALITY & 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 202, 202 (2015). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 190 Id. at 203. 
 191 Judson Brewer, Curiosity: Our Superpower for Everything from Breaking Bad Habits to  
Discovering Life, DR. JUD (Sept. 24, 2019), https://drjud.com/curiosity-superpower [https:// 
perma.cc/MX2W-D3S5]. 
 192 Lauriola et al., supra note 187, at 202. 
 193 Id. at 203. 
 194 Brewer, supra note 191. 
 195 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 14, at 422–23. 
 196 Note that, by introducing the terminology of curiosity to include the pursuit of information 
that might have some consequences, my usage seems to be in some tension with work that frames 
curiosity as wholly intrinsically motivated.  See, e.g., Nick Chater & George Loewenstein, The  
Under-Appreciated Drive for Sense-Making, 126 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 137, 145 (2016)  
(“Curiosity, by definition, refers to intrinsically motivated seeking after information . . . where the 
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Returning to the theme of trust and intimate relationships, then, I 
want to propose a framework that combines affective trust and epistemic 
curiosity.  What I think the law should encourage is the ability for indi-
viduals to feel safe and build bonds rooted in that feeling of safety, while 
also remaining open to and curious about information that could affect 
their well-being.  Whether legal regimes can directly engender trust or 
curiosity is an unanswered empirical question, but current knowledge 
about epistemic curiosity can help evaluate which regimes are better 
situated at least to enable or support affective trust and epistemic curi-
osity in intimate relationships.197 
Before applying this framework to Hasday’s proposals and other con-
texts, I want to conclude by noting a geographical and gendered dimen-
sion to curiosity.  Though we often think of curiosity as a positive quality 
or orientation or feeling,198 curiosity has not been encouraged or praised 
in equal measures across identities.199  Our celebrated portrayals of curi-
osity tend to be masculine, “able-bodied and quintessentially mobile” — 
bearing markers of “colonial and other unequal power relations.”200 The 
image of the European explorer, a lone man seeking out new lands in a 
dominating stance, is just one of Western culture’s “problematic symbols 
of curiosity and models for curious endeavours.”201  By contrast, icons of 
female curiosity include Eve and Pandora202 — a rather stark contrast.203  
Only some forms of curiosity are normative; our so-called natural curios-
ity is celebrated selectively.  Though the pages that follow will not delve 
into this, a topic that warrants further examination is the differential need 
for encouraging curiosity, across identities.   
* * * 
The rest of this Part identifies some possible directions for enabling 
affective trust and epistemic curiosity through law, beginning with 
Hasday’s proposals for reform. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
information we are ‘curious’ about has no implications for our evaluation . . . of our lives.”).  In 
later parts of the discussion, I also bring in curiosity that is more open-ended, see infra p. 2015, but 
I view curiosity as capacious enough to include both. 
 197 See infra sections III.C, pp. 2007–11, and III.D, pp. 2011–16. 
 198 Richard Phillips, Space for Curiosity, 38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 493, 493 (2014) (“In 
education and creative industries, ordinary workplaces and everyday life, [curiosity] is portrayed as 
a good thing, worthy of encouragement and support.”). 
 199 See id. at 502–03. 
 200 Id. at 502. 
 201 Id. 
 202 See, e.g., Gila Ofer & Joshua Durban, Curiosity: Reflections on Its Nature and Functions, 53 
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 35, 37–38 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, the Greek myth of Pandora’s box).  
 203 Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Law and Curiosity, 81 UMKC L. REV. 837, 839 (2013) (“Too much 
curiosity has been viewed by some thinkers as a type of intemperance — a vice from the virtue of 
temperance — related to excessive sensuality, cruelty, and an inordinate desire for things of the 
world.”).  
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B.  Hasday’s Proposals 
[A] human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for 
these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief . . . . 
— Samuel Taylor Coleridge204 
Hasday’s proposals implicitly reflect the framework of supporting 
both affective trust and epistemic curiosity.  This section draws out this 
feature of the book, through several examples, and then uses the frame-
work to question and refine two aspects of her normative prescription. 
1.  Proposals Supporting Affective Trust. — Hasday argues for re-
forms that would protect those duped by their intimates from the harsh 
consequences they currently face.  Principally, she argues for better 
aligning of the law of intimate deception with the law governing non-
intimate deception: “Judges are more likely to make wise decisions if 
they start with a rebuttable presumption that the law will provide rem-
edies for deception within an intimate relationship when redress would 
be available for an equivalent example of deception outside of intimacy” 
(p. 200).  Thus, under Hasday’s approach, 
[P]laintiffs who can establish all the elements of a claim for fraud, misrep-
resentation, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or the like — 
but were deceived by an intimate rather than a stranger . . . [ — will be 
presumed able to] pursue their claims without regard to whether they were 
intimates of the defendants when deceived.  (p. 204) 
Hasday’s reasons for supporting this approach include securing com-
pensation to plaintiffs for their injuries and helping to deter intimate 
deception in the first place (p. 199). 
As Hasday explains, some onlookers are skeptical about the injuries 
and reasons that duped intimates may sue.205  But she suggests there 
are a meaningful number of legitimate cases of financial as well as emo-
tional harm, in which plaintiffs sue in order to try “to secure at least 
partial compensation through money damages . . . notwithstanding the 
judiciary’s present hostility to such claims” (p. 201). 
Hasday recognizes that the law’s power to deter intimate deception 
is limited: “I do not believe that the law could ever completely deter 
intimate deception and would never promise that the incidence of inti-
mate deception would decline by a certain amount if courts adopt my 
proposed approach” (p. 201).  She recognizes “[m]yriad factors [that] con-
strain the law’s ability to deter,” such as deceivers’ ignorance of the law 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, 2 BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA; OR, BIOGRAPHICAL 
SKETCHES OF MY LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS 2 (2d ed. London, William Pickering 1847) 
(“In this idea originated the plan of the Lyrical Ballads; in which it was agreed, that my endeavours 
should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer 
from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these 
shadows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic 
faith.”). 
 205 See supra pp. 1968–69. 
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and a belief that their intimates wouldn’t sue them (p. 201).  Nonethe-
less, Hasday argues, law has a role to play: 
[E]ven a few well-publicized damage awards could jolt some people into 
worrying about whether deceiving their intimates could trigger legal liabil-
ity, or simply cause some deceivers to reassess the wisdom and justness of 
their actions.  Judicial victories for deceived intimates are especially likely 
to attract widespread media coverage and popular notice given the cultural 
fascination with intimate deception.  (p. 201) 
Under the “availability heuristic,”206 such media attention to recoveries 
by duped intimates might well be remembered.  And for those whose 
deception “involves sustained planning over time” — of which the kid-
ney case is a striking example — the potential for deterrence seems quite 
real (p. 201).  
If law can help create compensation for the material consequences 
of being duped, that might support particular plaintiffs in their ability 
to trust again, something that can be difficult after a dramatic breach.207  
More broadly, the prospect of a safety net — a pathway to compensation 
for financial and other injuries sustained — makes trusting a safer prop-
osition for everyone (or, rather, for everyone who has the money and 
time for civil litigation208).  A financial reward may fail to remedy an 
emotional injury, but it can quite literally compensate for financial or 
other material harm.209 
Others of Hasday’s proposals attempt to compensate victims or re-
duce deception in particular areas, for instance, by adding penalties for 
the harms of deception by those who perpetrate sham marriages (p. 229).  
Recall the woman who devoted half her work week for years to trying 
to bring her Soviet husband to the United States, only to learn after his 
successful arrival that he was merely using her to emigrate.210  The ef-
fects on her career and her time could have been compensated and, even 
if he was judgment proof when he arrived, the U.S. legal system has 
evolved mechanisms for restitutionary relief meted out over time that 
could have provided her with some measure of fiscal and emotional re-
lief for these injuries.  Hasday also notes that “the federal government 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 206 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) (“A person is said to employ the availa-
bility heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or 
associations could be brought to mind.”). 
 207 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 208 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the 
Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536–37 (2016).   
 209 A concern may of course be raised about crowding out, which merits more discussion, but 
should not undercut the overarching point ultimately made here: receiving material compensation for 
material harms makes trusting a safer proposition.  On crowding out, see, for example, Kristen  
Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and 
Sticks to Confront the Challenge of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 219–24 
(2016). 
 210 See supra notes 3–5, 10 and accompanying text (discussing Gubin v. Lodisev, 494 N.W.2d 782 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992)). 
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could reduce the incentives to deceive citizens into sham marriages for 
immigration purposes by increasing the opportunities for legal immigra-
tion that are open to people who are not closely related to United States 
citizens,” but does not hold out for an “overhaul” of the current immi-
gration system (p. 228).  She observes the oddity, however, of the current 
immigration system’s applying identical penalties to “[s]omeone who en-
tered a sham marriage in cahoots with a willing accomplice” and to 
“someone who duped an unwitting citizen into a marriage that the citi-
zen believed was genuine” (p. 228).  At the very least, she suggests, the 
limited resources for enforcement should be expended on “pursuing 
cases where the citizen was duped” (p. 228). 
2.  Proposals Supporting Epistemic Curiosity. — Hasday not only 
proposes mechanisms to protect intimates’ sense of safety or comfortable 
gullibility, but also offers proposals that would better allow intimates to 
protect themselves.  Of particular relevance to the framework I am sug-
gesting, Hasday recommends creating multistate registries of certain 
public records, so that people are better able to investigate their  
intimates (pp. 231–32). 
Hasday diagnoses a quandary surrounding investigating your inti-
mates: on the one hand, courts treat people (often women211) like fools 
for falling prey to deceptive partners (p. 123);212 on the other hand, the 
law also makes it exceedingly difficult to investigate an intimate partner 
(pp. 64–76).  This isn’t just an accidental artifact of laws seeking to 
protect everyone from the prying eyes of strangers or commercial enti-
ties.  Instead, Hasday argues, lawmakers passing anti-investigative laws 
“repeatedly recognized and appreciated that a substantial proportion of 
the investigations they were impeding would involve intimates” (p. 64).  
Finding the wherewithal to doubt intimates — to evince cognitive dis-
trust or epistemic curiosity — is hard enough.  Rather than supporting 
the curious impulse, though, the law makes things even harder for any-
one willing to inquire into the truth. 
Hasday’s proposed registries aim not to compromise privacy protec-
tions but to make public information about relevant intimate matters 
more readily available.  The law should make it easier for intimates to 
learn whether they are being deceived when such facilitation can be 
accomplished without jeopardizing privacy, liberty, or security (pp. 231–
32).  Given the difficulty of investigating an intimate, Hasday suggests 
“consolidat[ing] at least some public records and mak[ing] them more 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 211 On the gender dimensions, see supra Part I, pp. 1966–77. 
 212 One example that Hasday describes is a case in which the court “sent [the Indian male plain-
tiff] off with a version of the admonishment that courts frequently deploy when rejecting an inti-
mate deception claim, advising [him] that he should have conducted a more thorough premarital 
‘investigation’ to determine whether marrying [the female defendant] would be consistent with the 
caste system’s tenets” (p. 123) (citing Pavel v. Navitlal, 627 A.2d 683, 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 1992)). 
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accessible,” such as “a centralized registry recording all marriages and 
divorces in the United States” and “bigamy convictions” (pp. 231–32). 
This reform would help to enable the investigations that might grow 
from glimmers of cognitive distrust or epistemic curiosity.  Because the 
reform would lower the administrative burdens to conducting such an 
investigation, pursuing the inquiry wouldn’t require such sustained and 
robust doubt.213  Recent work in cognitive science suggests that curiosity 
is enhanced by knowledge gaps when an individual perceives they have 
the “skills, expertise, and resources needed to resolve the uncertainty.”214  
Whereas a knowledge gap that appears more difficult or impossible to 
resolve may lead to anxiety and diminished curiosity.215  Making infor-
mation more readily available may not only enable, but also enhance, 
curiosity. 
Moreover, if these investigations became easier, norms might shift as 
to whether such inquiries are appropriate or even expected — as  
opposed to their current status, among some, as unusual or even para-
noid.216  With the rise of internet dating, inter alia, in other communities 
investigating an intimate has already become expected or encour-
aged217 — and there, such a registry would facilitate access to reliable 
sources of information.  Knowing that sources are solid may also support 
affective trust, a feeling of safety, alongside enabling curiosity. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 213 On the role of administrative burdens in discouraging or thwarting certain actions, see, for 
example, PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN 15–41 (2018); 
Emens, supra note 4, at 1451–54; Nir Eyal, Paul L. Romain & Christopher Robertson, Can Ration-
ing Through Inconvenience Be Ethical?, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 10, 10. 
 214 Matthias J. Gruber & Charan Ranganath, How Curiosity Enhances Hippocampus-Dependent 
Memory: The Prediction, Appraisal, Curiosity, and Exploration (PACE) Framework, 23 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 1014, 1018 (2019) (citations omitted). 
 215 Id. at 1017; see also id. at 1018.  Note, however, that the latter citation may be referring more 
to what’s termed “trait curiosity,” which is a persistent feature of an individual, than to “state curi-
osity,” which is our subject here.   
 216 For a few examples of the popular view that a person who investigates their partner is paranoid 
or controlling, see Jenna Birch, Is It Ever OK to Read Your Partner’s Texts and Emails?, HEALTH (June 
7, 2018), https://www.health.com/relationships/should-you-snoop-on-partner [https://perma.cc/UH8M-
H5E3] (“Snooping won’t solve your relationship problems . . . .  If you cannot trust your partner, you 
either need to ‘take a serious look at your own insecurities or admit to yourself that you are with some-
one you do not trust . . . .  If you have to ask to see your partner’s texts or email, you have crossed a 
line.’” (quoting clinical psychologist Mary Lamia)); Andrea Bonior, 20 Signs Your Partner Is  
Controlling, PSYCH. TODAY (June 1, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/friendship-
20/201506/20-signs-your-partner-is-controlling [https://perma.cc/F6TD-LYLF] (“Perhaps he or she 
checks your phone, logs into your email, or constantly tracks your Internet history, and then justifies 
this by saying they’ve been burned before, [or] have trust issues . . . .  It’s a violation of your privacy, 
hand-in-hand with the unsettling message that they have no interest in trusting you and instead want 
to take on a police-like presence within your relationship.”). 
 217 See, e.g., Alyson Krueger, The Best Ways to “Research” Someone You Meet Online, FORBES 
(Apr. 30, 2014, 12:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alysonkrueger/2014/04/30/the-best-ways-to-
research-someone-you-meet-online [https://perma.cc/FZ8D-3SF9]; see also Study: How Single 
Americans Research Each Other Before Dates, JDP (Oct. 2018), https://www.jdp.com/blog/study-
online-dating-statistics [https://perma.cc/5VFX-C8SG].  The latter study is on point, but its conclu-
sion should be considered in light of the source: a company that specializes in screening people. 
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3.  A Proposal that Runs Counter to Trust. — One secondary solution 
Hasday offers fails the test of trustworthiness, or threatens to do so.  She 
floats as “worth serious consideration” (p. 224) the idea that, in order to 
claim parenthood on a birth certificate, a person should have to take a 
DNA test so that they would know whether they are a genetic parent 
and so adult children would later have access to this information (pp. 
221–26).  If implemented, she suggests, this policy would help prevent 
people (typically women) from lying to other people (typically men) 
about parentage (p. 221). 
Hasday presents this registration idea as a kind of stopgap proposal 
because deception over parentage is one area where Hasday wants to 
deny remedies for intimate deceivers; she views the potential damage to 
children — to have the person thought to be their parent suing for the 
damage of having been so thought — to outweigh the presumed- 
parent’s interest in the suit for deception (pp. 221–23).  A DNA registry 
would compensate for this exception to broader remedies for victims of 
intimate deception by providing some prophylaxis.  Under such a system 
of DNA registration, a “man would know before embarking on the life-
altering work of parenting a child whether he was that child’s biological 
father,” such that it would “protect that child from later shocks and  
disruptions” (p. 222). 
Hasday tries to make this DNA registry neutral between men and 
women, and between same-sex and different-sex couples, in the sense 
that anyone can register on the birth certificate once the testing is done 
(p. 221).  She proposes that, under the regime, “once a genetic parent 
agreed that someone without genetic ties to the child should be named 
as a legal parent on the birth certificate, genetics could not subsequently 
be a reason to privilege the genetic parent over the nongenetic parent in 
legal proceedings” (p. 222).  But as I read Hasday, such a rule is not 
neutral.  Under the regime she contemplates, it sounds as though parents 
must undergo genetic testing at the moment of the child’s birth, and one 
(genetic) intending parent will have the legal power to decide whether 
the other (nongenetic) intending parent is listed on the birth certificate.  
Such a regime not only treats couples with a mix of genetic and nonge-
netic parents differently than couples where all parents are genetically 
related to the child, but also assigns greater power to one parent in some 
couples.218 
Hasday also seems to put more trust in the authorities of science and 
law than is currently warranted.  For example, some work suggests that 
DNA testing may not be as reliable a determinant of parentage (and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 218 Hasday does not directly say that a genetic parent would have the legal authority to grant or 
deny parenthood to the other, but I infer some kind of authority from the phrase beginning “once a 
genetic parent agreed” quoted above (p. 222).  
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much else) as people tend to imagine.219  Hasday implies, however, that 
“quality control” challenges could be overcome “with sufficient money, 
time, and commitment” (p. 225).  In addition, law and regulations can-
not, at least not yet, safeguard privacy and prevent misuse and manip-
ulation of genetic information (p. 225).  Hasday suggests that protections 
such as “requir[ing] testing facilities to destroy the samples after using 
them” and “regulat[ing] testing facilities to safeguard against mistakes” 
could assuage privacy and quality control concerns (p. 225).  Unless or 
until the system proves trustworthy, though, nobody should be forced to 
trust it — especially not individuals in the throes of becoming parents, 
one way or another, and preparing to take a child home from the hospi-
tal or other site of arrival. 
The innovation Hasday contemplates would seem poised to diminish 
affective trust, the feeling of safety, for some people entering this central 
relationship together.  Moreover, it isn’t enabling curiosity or inquiry; it 
is forcing information on people who may not want it.  For example, 
some gay men will mix sperm so that they do not know from birth who 
is genetically related to a child they parent together.220  If Hasday’s pro-
posal requires them and the child to engage in genetic testing to establish 
who has genetic links at the time of birth, someone now has (possibly 
imperfect) information that those parents wanted no one to have.   
Preventing deception is not worth the bold and invasive experiment 
Hasday contemplates. 
Ultimately, Hasday raises multiple concerns about a genetic registry, 
and she does not fully endorse this proposal.  As noted earlier, she merely 
suggests it is “worth serious consideration” by lawmakers (p. 224).  So 
perhaps Hasday is also less than fully trusting of its merits. 
4.  Using the Framework to Refine Hasday’s Central Proposal. — 
The framework of affective trust and epistemic curiosity also helps build 
a firmer foundation for Hasday’s central proposal, and offers a narrower 
way to expand the scope of redress for intimate deception.  Hasday  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 219 See, e.g., Carl W. Gilmore, Challenging DNA in Paternity Cases: Finding Weaknesses in an 
Evidentiary Goliath, 90 ILL. B.J. 472, 474–75, 492 (2002); Peter Aldhous, The Danger of Unreliable 
Paternity Tests, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
mg20827893-200-the-danger-of-unreliable-paternity-tests [https://perma.cc/S2FH-G9DQ].  But see 
Adam Rutherford, How Accurate Are Online DNA Tests?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www. 
scientificamerican.com/article/how-accurate-are-online-dna-tests [https://perma.cc/Y2H4-Y2A7] 
(“When it comes to ancestry, DNA is very good at determining close family relations such as siblings 
or parents . . . .”).  On other concerns about DNA testing relevant to this discussion, see, for exam-
ple, Alondra Nelson, The Social Life of DNA: Racial Reconciliation and Institutional Morality 
After the Genome, 69 BRIT. J. SOC. 522, 532–33 (2018). 
 220 See, e.g., Dana Berkowitz & William Marsiglio, Gay Men: Negotiating Procreative, Father, 
and Family Identities, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 366, 378 (2007); Dean A. Murphy, The Desire for 
Parenthood: Gay Men Choosing to Become Parents Through Surrogacy, 34 J. FAM. ISSUES 1104, 
1117 (2013) (describing this practice as “intentional unknowing”). 
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argues that, rather than so commonly denying redress for intimate de-
ception, courts should adopt a presumption of treating intimate decep-
tion just like any other deception. 
This seems sensible enough.  And yet this proposal is vulnerable to 
the critique, discussed earlier,221 that it would open the courts to a flood 
of cases.  And more than just a numerical problem, which perhaps 
should be overcome if the change were warranted on the merits, the 
proposal must respond to the concern about courts trying to determine 
who is at fault when a conflict between intimates concerns the stuff of 
their intimacy.  As the critics of fault-based divorce have argued, deter-
mining fault in an intimate relationship is exceedingly difficult.222  
Moreover, the proposal leaves open the question of how courts are to 
know when the presumption of equal treatment for intimate deception 
is overcome, outside of cases involving subordinating norms related to 
race or gender.223 
The framework I present offers a way to navigate both of these di-
lemmas.  Under the framework, cases that concern the courts should be 
those in which one party has used the affective trust created or sustained 
through intimacy to overcome or subdue the other party’s epistemic cu-
riosity about a matter of life, liberty, or property.  That is, when one 
party’s sense of emotional safety is exploited to create a loss beyond the 
relationship itself, courts should be prepared to intervene. 
By way of illustration, all the cases set out at the start of this Review 
would have some prospect of recovery under this framework.  The 
woman in Gubin v. Lodisev224 whose Soviet husband married her for 
citizenship was duped into substantial labor, affecting her professional 
career, to support his immigration case.225  The young woman in Hanna 
v. Sheflin226 whose parents said they had invested her car accident re-
covery when they had actually spent it, lost the money and, perhaps, the 
chance to recover the money because of the time lapse facilitated by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 221 See supra section I.D, pp. 1973–78. 
 222 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 49, at 1296–97. 
 223 Hasday discusses several scenarios when courts should overcome the presumption, such as 
“when granting redress would inflict significant injury on a blameless third party or when telling 
the truth would have placed the deceiver or a third party in imminent physical danger” (p. 227; see 
also p. 207).  In her earlier discussion of the historical movement away from race-based claims of 
intimate deception, see supra notes 16 and 127 and accompanying text, and gender-subordinating 
norms explicitly animating these cases, see supra p. 1970, Hasday has already suggested that she 
would not want intimate deception cases to succeed where they rely on subordinating norms. 
 224 494 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
 225 Id. at 784. 
 226 275 S.W.3d 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 
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their lies.227  Lastly, in Dahl v. McNutt,228 the brother who gave up his 
kidney would clearly have a case that affective trust was manipulated 
to stem epistemic curiosity by him or his sister or both.  Whether his 
sister would have a viable claim would depend on whether she had 
meaningful losses beyond the disappointment of a failed relationship. 
As signaled by this last example, various cases would not be heard 
in court under this framework.  A suit alleging a breach of promise to 
marry would be dismissed, even if the promisor knew he was lying ra-
ther than merely changing his mind, in the absence of some material 
consequence beyond the loss of, or damage to, the relationship itself — 
as would a case of adultery.229  By contrast, bigamy would be actionable 
as a civil suit for intimate deception because the duped partner would 
be deprived of the legal status of spouse.230 
That this framework would apply to the three cases at the start of 
this Review does not mean that all these plaintiffs — or those like 
them — would necessarily win.  Nor does it mean the cases will be easy 
to resolve.  But this refinement of Hasday’s proposal offers a way to 
parse which cases of intimate deception should receive a full and fair 
trial, rather than being dismissed as beyond the purview of the courts: 
those cases in which an intimate trades on the affective trust of the other, 
to compromise the epistemic curiosity (or cognitive distrust) of the other, 
resulting in losses beyond the relationship itself.231 
By offering parties the possibility of compensation in such cases, un-
der Hasday’s proposal or this variation on it, courts will better support 
affective trust, allowing intimates to rest more safely in their relation-
ships, because the material consequences of being duped are not as 
great — as discussed earlier.232  And courts will also be supporting ep-
istemic curiosity, because pursuing an inkling that an intimate has lied 
may well lead to a firmer answer and material compensation in the 
courts, in at least some circumstances.  Curiosity may ultimately be re-
warded by more than just disappointment. 
* * * 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 227 Id. at 425.  Since she waited some time before asking for the money, the additional time lapse 
may not have mattered, but this would presumably be an argument she would make, which might 
get some traction.   
 228 No. C3-97-601906, slip op. (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1998). 
 229 Hasday describes cases of breach of promise to marry and adultery (pp. 101–04).  Note that 
Hasday does not argue for repeal of the anti–heart balm statutes, so many breach of promise to 
marry cases would also be unsuccessful under her proposed regime. 
 230 Hasday discusses cases of bigamy (pp. 163–65). 
 231 And indeed, this proposal may not alter many outcomes beyond Hasday’s proposal, since hers 
piggybacks on the law of non-intimate deception and so some harm beyond the relationship may 
be effectively required there as well.  
 232 See supra section III.B.1, pp. 1999–2001. 
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The framework set out here also helps to illuminate two other legal 
contexts: a recent innovation in the law of evidence; and a novel ap-
proach to prenuptial agreements.  The final two sections consider each 
in turn. 
C.  Jettisoning Trust: Spousal Privilege in State v. Gutierrez   
The fact that nothing you say to your spouse can be used against you 
in a court of law makes me feel safe. 
— Elie Mystal233 
In the month after Oxford published Intimate Lies and the Law, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court issued a landmark decision.  With the rul-
ing in State v. Gutierrez,234 New Mexico became the only state with no 
form of spousal privilege.235  The question of whether to exclude evi-
dence based on spousal privilege is complicated, and this short section 
does not attempt a full weighing of the values and costs at stake.  But 
an attention to the need for both affective trust and epistemic curiosity 
adds an overlooked element to the debates. 
In the law of evidence, the spousal privilege comprises two quite 
different privileges: testimonial and marital confidences.  Under the tes-
timonial privilege, a person may refuse to testify, or be prevented from 
testifying, against a spouse.236  Under the marital confidences privilege, 
a person may exclude testimony about communications made privately 
between spouses during a marriage.237  A majority of states and the 
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 233 Elie Mystal, New Mexico Abolishes Spousal Privilege and I Have No Idea Who to Talk to 
About That, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 6, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/09/new-
mexico-abolishes-spousal-privilege [https://perma.cc/Q2UB-S5AV]. 
 234 No. S-1-SC-36394, 2019 WL 4167270 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019). 
 235 Id. at *21 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 236 See, e.g., RUTTER GROUP PRACTICE GUIDE, FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS & EVIDENCE 
8:3740; Michael H. Graham, Husband-Wife Privilege: Testimonial, in 4 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 505:1 (8th ed.); Marital Privilege, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/marital_privilege [https://perma.cc/9NJ4-MNTJ].  There are variations across the 
fifty states as to whether the privilege applies to civil cases, criminal cases, or both; whether it 
applies only during a marriage or also after a marriage has ended; and which spouse(s) are able to 
prevent testimony.  All states recognize exceptions for civil suits between spouses and cases where 
one spouse commits a crime against the other.  See Memorandum from Zane Muller to Elizabeth 
F. Emens (Jan. 18, 2020) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter Muller Mem-
orandum] (compiling current law of testimonial and marital privileges in all fifty states). 
  In most of the states that recognize the testimonial privilege, and in the federal courts, the 
right lies with the witness spouse, who may waive the privilege over the defendant spouse’s objec-
tion.  See Muller Memorandum, supra; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) 
(setting out the testimonial privilege rule in federal courts).  In some states, however, the privilege 
is held by only the defendant spouse or by both spouses.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4062 (2009) (granting the privilege exclusively to the defendant spouse); KY. R. EVID. 504(a) (grant-
ing the privilege to both spouses); see also Muller Memorandum, supra. 
 237 As with the testimonial privilege, there is variation across jurisdictions in who holds the priv-
ilege and whether it applies in civil cases, criminal cases, or both.  See Muller Memorandum, supra 
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federal courts recognize the testimonial privilege, though a sizable num-
ber have affirmatively abandoned it and others have limited its scope.238  
Prior to Gutierrez, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the fed-
eral courts recognized the marital confidences privilege in some form.239 
New Mexico eliminated the testimonial privilege nearly forty years 
ago.240  With Gutierrez, New Mexico also became the first state to end 
the marital confidences privilege.241  In the eponymous case, Gutierrez 
had revealed a secret to both his first wife and his second wife, which 
he sought to suppress at his trial.242  The secret was that he murdered 
his first wife’s uncle, a few months after she told Gutierrez that the uncle 
had raped her repeatedly.243  Gutierrez told her “not to worry about 
anything anymore,” and later he came home agitated, showed her the 
body, and involved her in looking for a bullet casing he’d left there.244  
After their divorce, he ended up telling his second wife, after his parents 
repeatedly stated that they would “send him away for the rest of his 
life.”245  Ultimately Gutierrez and his second wife separated as well, and 
Gutierrez was indicted thirteen years after the murder.246  At his murder 
trial, Gutierrez sought to exclude both women’s testimony about his 
confessions, and on appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court decided to 
abolish the marital confidences privilege.247 
Chief Justice Judith Nakamura’s majority opinion reviewed several 
arguments for and against the privilege, including the position that pro-
tecting marital confidences supports privacy and autonomy, as well as 
encourages communication between spouses.248  The opinion concluded, 
however, that the opposing arguments won the day.249  Among other 
reasons, the court was not persuaded that the privilege makes any  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
note 236.  In some cases, marital confidences are not admissible regardless of the wishes of the 
parties.  R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
339, 366–67 (2006). 
 238 Cassidy, supra note 237, at 364–65 (“Thirty one states and the District of Columbia recognize 
the adverse testimonial privilege [as of 2006].  Nineteen states have abandoned this privilege en-
tirely . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Muller Memorandum, supra note 236.   
 239 Cassidy, supra note 237, at 365–66 (noting that, as of 2006, “[a]ll fifty states and the District 
of Columbia recognize a privilege for confidential communications between spouses” (citation omit-
ted)); United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the federal marital 
confidences privilege); see also Muller Memorandum, supra note 236. 
 240 Richard A. Gonzales, Evidence, 11 N.M. L. REV. 159, 175 (1980–1981). 
 241 State v. Gutierrez, No. S-1-SC-36394, 2019 WL 4167270, at *21 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019) (Vigil, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
 242 Id. at *1 (majority opinion). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at *4–8. 
 249 Id. at *8. 
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practical difference in whether spouses communicate, because people 
don’t know about the privilege250 and because they don’t go to court 
very often.251  “Spouses communicate openly with one another due to 
the ‘trust they place in the loyalty and discretion of each other,’ not 
because the privilege shields their communications from future disclo-
sure in court.”252 
Two justices dissented from the ruling.  Justice Charles Daniels 
agreed with the change, but objected to the court’s decision on institu-
tional grounds.253  Justice Barbara Vigil, by contrast, dissented on the 
merits.254  Her opinion began one of its sections by quoting Obergefell255: 
“Marriage ‘fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that 
express our common humanity.’”256  This sounds in our notion of affec-
tive trust, as does some of the commentary following the decision: 
“[T]hat spousal privilege just seems like a thing that gets to the heart of 
keeping the state out of your life.  The fact that nothing you say to your 
spouse can be used against you in a court of law makes me feel safe.”257  
Justice Vigil’s dissent argued: “As a solemn vow of unity, marriage cre-
ates for many a sacred space to share oneself with a chosen other.  That 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 250 Id. at *6 (“One of its principal weaknesses is that it rests on two untested assumptions: that 
(1) married people know the privilege exists, and (2) they rely on it when deciding how much infor-
mation to share.” (citing 1 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 86, at 523 (7th 
ed. 2013))).  Chief Justice Nakamura continued, noting that “[c]ritics argue ‘that there is no empir-
ical evidence to support [these] factual assumptions.’”  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 
25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 25 FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 5572, at 532 (1989)). 
 251 Id. (“Additionally, most people are unlikely to alter their behavior based on the privilege be-
cause most people seldom appear in court and do not tailor their conversations around what may 
or may not be privileged.”). 
 252 Id. (quoting BROUN, supra note 250, § 86, at 523). 
 253 Id. at *21 (Daniels, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “a change 
to an evidence rule, particularly a significant change unnecessary to a dispositive outcome in litiga-
tion before us, should be handled through our established rules process, with input from the rules 
committee, with input from the larger legal community, and with input from the state we serve”).  
Since our subject is intimacy, it is perhaps worth noting that Justice Daniels apparently died two 
days after writing this opinion, and some of his language suggests a fond farewell to his colleagues.  
Eugene Volokh, N.M. Abolishes Marital Communication Privilege, Based in Large Part on Femi-
nist Arguments, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 14, 2019, 5:10 PM), https://reason.com/2019/09/14/n-
m-abolishes-marital-communication-privilege-based-largely-on-feminist-arguments 
[https://perma.cc/7AYT-ZXWW]. 
 254 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *16 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 255 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 256 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599). 
 257 Mystal, supra note 233 (emphasis added).  The argument continues, “I’d argue that the con-
fines of one’s relationship is where the expectation of privacy is the strongest.  I don’t have to know 
how it works to know, and justifiably rely upon the fact, that when I fantasize with my spouse the 
six people I’d like to see die in a structure fire, that’s not going to come back on me if one of those 
people ends up falling down an elevator shaft in our building.”  Id. 
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space should remain free from state intrusion and compulsion that 
would demand one spouse to reveal the intimate secrets of the other.”258 
The gender dimensions of this case are interesting, and they feature 
explicitly in the majority opinion.  Chief Justice Nakamura mentioned, 
among other arguments, that the privilege has been used to shield do-
mestic abusers.259  As the dissent from Justice Vigil pointed out, how-
ever, New Mexico’s spousal privilege already had an exception for  
domestic violence.260  Chief Justice Nakamura also observed that most 
defendants who invoke the privilege, even today, are men, using it to 
prevent women from betraying their confidences.261 
Her concern with men preventing women from revealing their se-
crets is typical in its focus on the ex post scenario, where secrets have 
already been revealed, and the question is how to handle them.  What 
is overlooked are the gender implications of whether the secrets are 
shared in the first place. 
Courts commonly assume that men tell their wives their misdeeds.262  
He must have told her — is an implicit if not explicit refrain.  Reading 
Intimate Lies and the Law casts a spotlight on how often he doesn’t tell 
her.  Moreover, it’s not so surprising that courts aren’t as inclined to say, 
She must have asked him if he did it.  We do not assume that women 
ask their mates the hard questions.  We do not encourage them to do so.  
“Trust . . . then jump!” is our romantic myth instead. 
Gutierrez did reveal the secret of his crime to both his first wife and 
his second wife.263  The first time was to seek wife #1’s help with the 
cover-up.264  The second was also not whispers across a pillow.  Instead, 
overhearing an argument between Gutierrez and his parents led wife #2 
to ask.265  Nonetheless, she did ask, and he did tell.266 
Evincing curiosity about this kind of bad news is no easy feat.  The 
growing literature on information avoidance is spotlighting just how 
much people feel they do not want to know bad news.267  Such inklings 
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 258 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 259 See id. at *8 (majority opinion). 
 260 Id. at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)  (“The Majority’s argument that 
the spousal communications privilege cannot be justified on privacy grounds without ignoring the 
private pain of domestic violence victims itself ignores that New Mexico has abrogated the spousal 
communications privilege in cases where one spouse is accused of inflicting harm on the other.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 261 Id. at *7–8 (majority opinion). 
 262 See, e.g., United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 2003).  I thank Daniel 
Richman for this point. 
 263 Gutierrez, 2019 WL 4167270, at *1. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Rocio Garcia-Retamero, Cassandra’s Regret: The Psychology of 
Not Wanting to Know, 124 PSYCHOL. REV. 179, 193 (2017); Russell Golman, David Hagmann & 
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of curiosity may need whatever encouragement they can get.  And, as 
discussed earlier, recent empirical work suggests that people’s curiosity 
is increased by the prospect of actually getting an answer to a query.268  
In addition, knowing that your spouse could tell you their secrets, and 
feel those secrets are as safe with you as with their lawyer, could help 
support affective trust, a feeling of safety.269 
Taken together, these points present one more argument on the side 
of preserving the marital confidences privilege.  Though deciding 
whether the privilege is justified goes beyond the scope of this Review, 
the need to build affective trust and epistemic curiosity supplies one 
more reason to wish the justices had paused to read Hasday’s latest 
book, released one month earlier, before making New Mexico the first 
state to abolish the marital confidences privilege. 
D.  Trust . . . and Ask: Prenup Wrappers 
Why do so many couples opt for the same vows? 
— Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers270 
Whatever else it might do, a marital confidences evidentiary privi-
lege will do nothing for partners who are not, or not yet, married — 
many of whom populate the pages of Intimate Lies and the Law.  This 
section considers an innovation to support affective trust and epistemic 
curiosity among the not-yet-married. 
Most marrying couples don’t appear to sign prenuptial agreements, 
as noted earlier.271  The mythology of “trust . . . then jump” seems in-
compatible with the standard agenda of the prenup: to plot a pathway 
through divorce.  Suggesting a prenup therefore makes a person sound 
less serious about marriage or commitment. 
Professor Gary Becker once proposed a solution to this dilemma: 
mandatory prenups.272  If everyone has to sign a prenup, then the fact 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
George Loewenstein, Information Avoidance, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 96, 96–97 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Ruining Popcorn?: The Welfare Effects of Information, 58 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 125–27 
(2019); see also Caroline J. Charpentier, Ethan S. Bromberg-Martin & Tali Sharot, Valuation of 
Knowledge and Ignorance in Mesolimbic Reward Circuitry, 115 PNAS, at E7255 (2018) (finding, 
inter alia, that reward systems in the brain lead humans to choose ignorance about unfavorable 
future outcomes). 
 268 See supra p. 2002. 
 269 Cf. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2045, 2115 (1995) (making a related point about the testimonial privilege).   
 270 Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Couples Should Negotiate Their Marriage Vows, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012, 12:32 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/01/20/the- 
gingrich-question-cheating-vs-open-marriage/couples-should-negotiate-their-marriage-vows 
[https://perma.cc/4KVD-2QSF]. 
 271 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.   
 272 Gary S. Becker, Why Every Couple Should Sign a Contract, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 1997, 
12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1997-12-28/why-every-married-couple-
should-sign-a-contract [https://perma.cc/T8Y6-UJ38]. 
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of doing so would convey nothing about a person’s intentions — beyond 
what is said in the prenup itself.273  And of course a prenup could clarify, 
in a separate property state, that all property is shared and that partners 
plan to take care of each other, should divorce occur, contrary to the 
usual self-protective, individualistic vision of prenups.274  Prenups can 
also be limited by so-called sunset clauses, shifting partners into the state 
defaults after a period of years once they know each other better.275  For 
better or worse, though, the resistance to mandatory anything in this 
country makes Becker’s proposal unlikely to take hold. 
This leads to the question whether, instead of becoming mandatory, 
prenups could become more appealing.  Writing prenups could be part 
of designing a life together, of making affirmative and positive commit-
ments.  Prenups could be more like marriage vows — and thus writing 
them might be more like a wedding than a divorce. 
We might call these aspirational documents “prenup wrappers.”276  The 
name comes from the tool of “exam wrappers,” informal self-assessment 
forms completed by students after taking an exam or upon receiving it 
back.277  An exam wrapper encourages a student to be curious about their 
practices and performance to date and intentions for the future; in a sense, 
then, exam wrappers aim to encourage a student’s curiosity about sub-
stance and process, alongside the formal evaluation of an exam grade.278 
A prenup wrapper would, similarly, couple informal inquiry with the 
formal legal apparatus of an enforceable prenup.  It might cover, for 
instance, any of the following: general aspirations (such as the kinds of 
things typically found in wedding vows); daily intentions (such as how 
partners aim to treat each other or appreciate each other in a routine 
way279); roles and responsibilities (such as how partners intend to divvy 
up household labor, which could be “customized” and more or less de-
tailed, or which could use an off-the-rack model like “gender equity” or 
“relational” roles280); shared values (such as agreements about  
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 273 See id. 
 274 See, e.g., LAURIE ISRAEL, THE GENEROUS PRENUP 12–15, 41–54 (2018); Laurie Israel, 
How to Mediate a Prenuptial Agreement, IVKDLAW (2017), http://ivkdlaw.com/how-to-mediate-a-
prenuptial-agreement [https://perma.cc/9W28-62TB]. 
 275 A Sunset Clause Can Test a Marriage, WEINMAN & ASSOCIATES (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.weinmanfamilylaw.com/blog/2016/05/a-sunset-clause-can-test-a-marriage.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/LW2B-7BEH]. 
 276 I thank Ian Harris for the thoughtful question that sparked this idea of prenup wrappers.   
 277 E.g., Sarah J. Schendel, What You Don’t Know (Can Hurt You): Using Exam Wrappers to 
Foster Self-Assessment Skills in Law Students, 40 PACE L. REV. 154, 161–62 (2020). 
 278 Id. 
 279 Cf. STAN TATKIN, WIRED FOR LOVE 98–101 (2012). 
 280 These terms come from Professor Barbara Stark’s proposal for “marriage proposals” in which 
partners claim their model going in to the marriage, with legal consequences.  Barbara Stark, Mar-
riage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 
1528–29 (2001).   
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monogamy281 or parenting); hard times (such as plans for challenging 
events that might arise, like job loss); questions for inquiry (such as a 
record of questions asked of themselves and each other pre-marriage, 
from the existential to the mundane to the probing282); or process inten-
tions (such as an agreement on process if they disagree or one or both 
are contemplating separation).  Wholesale versions would be available, 
but of course partners could choose to customize and do more, less, or 
something other than this list of possible elements. 
The prenup wrapper would be conceived with the understanding 
that change would occur, which is one reason not to attempt to make 
the wrapper legally enforceable.  “Lifestyle clauses” in prenups — which 
integrate some of the items proposed here within the four corners of a 
prenup — are often unenforceable, and even in states that enforce them, 
their enforcement is unpredictable.283  Another reason, then, not to in-
clude them in the prenup itself is so partners avoid the cost of paying a 
lawyer to review these items.284  Moreover, these lifestyle clauses tend 
to be framed more in terms of prohibitions and consequences — for 
instance, limits on how much weight a spouse can gain285 — rather than 
in any more affirmative vision of shared values or intentions.  
The prenup wrapper is similar in some ways to, for instance, a “letter 
of intent” to designated guardian(s) that a parent writing a will might 
complete.286  Such a letter is unenforceable, but a trusts and estates law-
yer might recommend it as a vehicle for communicating the child’s needs 
and the parents’ aspirations for the child’s care.  A lawyer might there-
fore provide a version with blanks to help the client complete the pro-
cess.  The prenup wrapper is different, however, in the present purposes 
it may serve for those who create it. 
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 281 See, e.g., Lifestyle Clauses and Marital Agreements, FROST & BECK PC (Mar. 19, 2014) 
https://www.frostbecklaw.com/blog/2014/03/lifestyle-clauses-and-marital-agreements.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/J8WU-VW9U]. 
 282 For ideas for these kinds of questions, see generally, for example, SUSAN PIVER, THE HARD 
QUESTIONS (2000), or, more playfully, GREGORY STOCK, THE BOOK OF QUESTIONS (2013). 
 283 See, e.g., Lifestyle Clauses and Marital Agreements, supra note 281; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 
No Cheating! Lifestyle Clauses Gain Popularity in Prenups, ABA J. (June 5, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/no_cheating_lifestyle_clauses_gain_popularity_in_prenups 
[https://perma.cc/ZD3E-QR6A]; What’s a Prenuptial “Lifestyle” Clause?, MARVEL & WONG, PLLC 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.mwfamilylaw.com/blog/2018/02/whats-a-prenuptial-lifestyle-clause.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/X9YY-T7QA]. 
 284 Of course this is not necessarily a plus for the lawyers. 
 285 See, e.g., Monica Mizzi, Should You Add a “Lifestyle Clause” to Your Prenup? (Or Are They 
Just for Celebrities?), HUFFPOST (July 22, 2016, 12:18 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/ 
entry/should-you-add-a-lifestyle-clause-to-your-prenup_b_57908891e4b0a9208b5f1876 
[https://perma.cc/ZW8H-3LV6]. 
 286 See, e.g., Kate Moss, Letter of Intent: A Way to Communicate Your Wishes into the Future, 
TEX. SCH. FOR BLIND & VISUALLY IMPAIRED, http://www.tsbvi.edu/seehear/archive/intent.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QKX7-68XP].  
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Various authorities, from lawmakers and legal scholars to mental 
health professionals and religious advisors, have encouraged partners 
contemplating marriage to engage in big conversations or premarital 
counseling.287  What distinguishes prenup wrappers is that the extrale-
gal conversation is wrapped around — “braided” with288 — the legal 
inquiry, rather than constituting a separate event, on the one hand, or 
an actual component of the formal legal prenup, on the other.289  The 
aim would be to support both epistemic curiosity and affective trust. 
The formal legal prenup is commonly seen as an emblem of dis-
trust — not even of curiosity, however defined.  As one commentator 
put it, “If you want a prenup, you don’t want marriage.”290  To combine 
its creation with a process of setting out affirmative aspirations may 
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 287 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.0305 (2014) (reducing the marriage license fee by $32.50 if couples 
engage in premarital counseling with a qualified psychologist, social worker, therapist, or religious 
institution representative); Matthew J. Astle, An Ounce of Prevention: Marital Counseling Laws as 
an Anti-divorce Measure, 38 FAM. L.Q. 733, 741–743 (2004) (discussing the history of premarital 
counseling legislation and arguing that more states should follow Florida’s approach of incentiviz-
ing premarital counseling as a means to lower divorce rates); Nicole Licata, Note, Should Premar-
ital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Requisite to Obtaining a Marriage License?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 
518, 521–25 (2002) (noting the prevalence of premarital counseling programs in religious institutions 
and arguing that because premarital counseling has significant policy benefits, including reducing 
the likelihood of divorce, it should be required prior to obtaining a marriage license); Amanda 
Kepler, Marital Satisfaction: The Impact of Premarital and Couples Counseling 14–18 (2015) (un-
published M.S.W. clinical research paper, St. Catherine University), https://sophia.stkate.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=msw_papers [https://perma.cc/4X6S-F7DU] (collecting 
studies concluding that premarital counseling provides significant benefits to couples); Caroline 
Sweatt-Eldredge, Do You Really Need Premarital Counseling?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-connected-life/201706/do-you-really-need- 
premarital-counseling [https://perma.cc/6HPQ-D9HL] (“Studies reveal that premarital counseling 
is an effective tool to use as you begin your married life.  Researchers have discovered that it is a 
helpful way to improve your communication and conflict management skills while increasing your 
overall relationship quality and satisfaction.”). 
 288 Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal 
and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2010) 
(“The contract combines formal and informal methods of enforcement through a process we term 
‘braiding.’  This technique builds trust, and problem solving capacity more generally, by interweav-
ing formal and informal terms in ways that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation 
process.” (citations omitted)). 
 289 This braiding feature also distinguishes prenup wrappers from the “marriage contracts” that 
Lenore Weitzman has written about — though Weitzman’s work could offer interesting ideas for 
topics to be covered in prenup wrappers; in addition, those who wanted to create legally enforceable 
contracts in lieu of state marriage might also want to create nonenforceable wrappers to cover topics 
beyond what they wanted (or could get) enforced.  See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE 
CONTRACT 417–58 app. (1981) (finding that intimate contracts were more egalitarian than tradi-
tional marriage roles, while acknowledging the notable limits and selection bias in the study design); 
see also Lenore J. Weitzman et al., Contracts for Intimate Relationships: A Study of Contracts  
Before, Within, and in Lieu of Legal Marriage, 1 ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 303, 311–13 (1978) 
(describing intimate contracts).   
 290 W. Bradford Wilcox, If You Want a Prenup, You Don’t Want Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 
2013, 3:25 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/21/the-power-of-the-prenup/if-
you-want-a-prenup-you-dont-want-marriage [https://perma.cc/6JG5-ESDX]. 
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make the prenup more palatable — thus supporting epistemic curiosity 
in the form of an active stance toward the problem of what-if-the-worst-
happens.291  More substantively, the prenup wrapper encourages inter-
personal curiosity292 at a moment when its opposite — “trust . . . then 
jump” — is celebrated and mythologized.  This may help prepare for 
challenging times ahead by confronting some of those challenges with 
eyes wide open now.293 
Moreover, the process of learning about each other and communi-
cating about past, present, and future may help to build connection and 
deepen the relationship in the present moment.294  The openness associ-
ated with interest curiosity, that subspecies of epistemic curiosity, may 
be cultivated by such dialogue.295  A prenup wrapper might even con-
tain questions the parties intend to ask at particular intervals, or some 
other process for cultivating genuine curiosity about one another.296  Re-
lationships vary, and only some marrying couples would opt for this 
approach.  But for those who do, the prenup wrapper could support 
affective trust as well as truthful exchange.297  Trust . . . and ask.298 
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 291 Cf., e.g., Becker, supra note 272; Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 270 (making the case for 
individualized marriage contracts outside the context of a prenup as a means of strengthening mar-
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 292 Cf., e.g., Karl Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract: Defining the Terms of the Relationship, 8 
FAM. L.Q. 27, 29–31 (1974).   
 293 See id.; cf. DEWEY, supra note 184, at 26 (“The exercise of thought is, in the literal sense of 
the word, inference . . . .  It involves a jump, a leap, a going beyond what is surely known . . . .  The 
very inevitableness of the jump, the leap, to something unknown, only emphasizes the necessity of 
attention to the conditions under which it occurs so that the danger of a false step may be lessened 
and the probability of a right landing increased.”). 
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Cross-Sectional, Daily Process, and Behavioral Evidence, 81 J. PERSONALITY 87, 96 (2013).  Not 
only does that initial “explore, discover” phase pass with time; other factors also push against inter-
est curiosity in a long-term relationship, including pressures to conform to a partner’s expectations 
or confidence in their knowledge (How did I not know you whistle?) or a partner’s wants or sensi-
tivities (But you like going to visit my family, right?).  On some of the values of curiosity in rela-
tionships, see, for example, id. at 89–90, 98.  Credit for the whistling reference goes to MARY 
OLIVER, The Whistler, in OUR WORLD 85, 85 (2007). 
 298 For many, this calls to mind the Russian saying, “Trust, but verify,” or “Doveryai no 
proveryai,” made famous in U.S. circles by President Ronald Reagan’s fondness for it.  See, e.g., 
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Happy prenup wrappers and spousal testimonial privileges illustrate 
the uses of considering affective trust alongside epistemic curiosity, but 
they help only those who marry or contemplate marriage.  Hasday’s cen-
tral proposal, however, reaches more broadly.  If courts begin presuming 
that intimate lies be treated the same as other lies, trusting gets safer 
across relationship types — as safe as trusting can be, that is.  And these 
cases can be usefully cabined by limiting successful claims of intimate de-
ception to those cases in which one partner parlays affective trust to over-
come epistemic curiosity and engage in self-dealing.  Such a legal regime 
should support affective trust and epistemic curiosity in intimate relation-
ships without flooding the courts with disappointed lovers. 
CONCLUSION 
[N]orms promoting trust within intimacy can help foster individual 
fulfillment, productive cooperation, committed caregiving, and satisfying 
community life . . . . 
— Jill Elaine Hasday (p. 51) 
Hasday has supplied a rigorous, engaging treatment of intimate lies 
and the law.  She has shed light on the gender dimensions of our practices 
of lying and truth telling, and the system that supports those practices.  
And this important book has also offered provocative questions and 
promising proposals to support a combination of trust and distrust. 
I have presented a framework combining affective trust and epis-
temic curiosity to evaluate Hasday’s proposals and recent legal develop-
ments as well as to spur innovations.  Ultimately, if cognitive distrust 
takes the form of curiosity, not insatiable but willing to be satisfied even-
tually, then that curiosity may well support a deeper form of affective 
trust.  Asking the questions in the back of their minds may better enable 
partners to inhabit the trust that comes after the answers. 
Intimate Lies and the Law has illuminated this overlooked area of 
law and offered some promising ideas for legal reform.  Perhaps this 
compelling book will also make it easier for individuals to ask hard 
questions, to find out the answers, and to settle in to a feeling of security 
in their intimate relationships, comforted by the legal and social safety 
net that can catch them when they fall. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Barton Swaim, “Trust, but Verify”: An Untrustworthy Political Phrase, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 
2016), http://wapo.st/1TTQyw5 [https://perma.cc/K4BK-KW9K].  Note that Barton Swaim appears 
to define trust like Carol Rose’s “real trust,” Rose, supra note 70, at 534, rather than disaggregating 
the affective and cognitive components, as my framework does — and therefore does not believe 
it’s possible both to trust and to verify.  Swaim, supra. (“Of course, taken on its own, the phrase is 
either ambiguous or meaningless: If you trust, you won’t insist on verifying, whereas if you insist 
on verifying, clearly you don’t trust.”). 
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